Special attention was devoted to determining the place of fire support in the combat formation and its application in battle. Characteristically, the troop formation used in an advance was a function of the degree of preparation which the mujahideen had put into their defensive positions and whether the commander was employing assault detachments and assault groups.¹ As a rule, the offenses were launched from base camps or jumping-off areas and because of their distance from the combat zone, organizing movement became very important.

14. Assault on the outskirts of Herat

by Major V. M. Bogdashkin²

The situation in Herat Province was very serious in the fall of 1984. Guerrilla forces, led by Captain Ismail, received trained reinforcements as well as new weapons from Iran. They launched raids on Soviet and Afghan convoys and struck at the Kushka-Shindand pipeline. They constituted a threat to the Herat airfield and grain elevators.

The operational group of the regiment with field post number (FPN)³ 51883 was ordered to: block part of the southern edge of Herat city with the 2nd MRB (minus a company) and fragment the mujahideen force. Further, in coordination with the 2nd MRB of FPN 83260 regiment and the 3rd MRB of FPN 51931 regiment, destroy the enemy.

Preparation for this action was conducted in base camp. All company commanders and above, plus all the attached company commanders conducted coordination on a terrain model. Enemy courses of action and the sequencing of his destruction were also worked out on the terrain model. Personnel who would physically close with the mujahideen conducted training in a deserted village where they became familiar with the specific make-up of an assault group and gained practical experience.

At the end of October, my company (the 7th MRC) was designated part of the operational group of regiment FPN 51883 which assembled outside Herat. At 0400 hours on 4 November, our subunits were ordered into the city. By 0540 hours, the force blocked off the eastern section of the city. The east side was held by FPN 83260, the north and west sides were held by FPN 51931 and the south side by my regiment FPN 51883.

Map 14: Combat by a reinforced MRC serving as an assault group.

At 0600 hours, FPN 51883 regiment committed its mountain motorized rifle battalion⁴ to battle and it managed to cut off and surround a group of mujahideen. However, other mujahideen pounded this battalion with small arms, rocket launchers, cannon and mortars. The battalion had stumbled into a mujahideen fire sack. In the course of 40 minutes, the battalion lost nine killed or wounded and was forced to stop and go over to the defense.

Regiment ordered my 7th MRC to turn over our portion of the southern block to a bronegruppa and to move to the command post of FPN 51883 regiment. My regimental commander was LTC A. M. Budeyev. He ordered my company commander, Senior Lieutenant S. N. Bogrov, to advance along a city street to fragment the defending mujahideen force. My MRC had two BMP-2s⁵ and a tank as part of our assault group.

Following a five-minute artillery strike, the 7th MRC went into battle at 0730 hours. It advanced 150–200 meters when it was stopped by heavy small arms fire as well as the fire from two recoilless rifles, a grenade launcher and a mortar. The small arms fire came from close range from a grape arbor and through embrasures cut in the adobe walls. One of our soldiers was wounded. The company commander was ordered to break contact and withdraw. After his professional, organized withdrawal (there were no more casualties), the company deployed along the edges of a village.

Afghan intelligence reported that there were some 800 men in the guerrilla forces which operated in this immediate territory (25 square kilometers) but we had no idea how many we were facing now. We called in ground attack aircraft⁶ and artillery fire on the encircled mujahideen. Three artillery battalions from division artillery fired in our support.

The company commander asked for two 152mm SP howitzers and another tank. He received these plus a sapper squad with 75 kilograms of explosive. The 1st and 2nd platoon leaders (Captain P. P. Rozhkov and Lieutenant V. I. Nikitenko were ordered to advance from the company flanks through the grape arbor and blow up the adobe walls.

LTC A. M. Budeyev, the regimental commander, requested two BM-21 “Grad” 122mm multiple rocket launchers to conduct direct fire as needed by the company commander. Following an airstrike, the BM-21s opened fire. Supporting artillery simultaneously began a 10-minute artillery preparation. The company moved forward to the attack under this protective fire.

The BM-21 direct-fire salvos did not inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, but did have a tremendous effect on their morale. The company advanced 300 meters before the first mujahideen fired on it. Mujahideen fire was very weak. On signals from the company and platoon commanders, the two SP 152mm howitzers, two tanks and four BMPs opened direct suppressive fire on the enemy. The flanking platoons were able to move at the same tempo as the center and signaled their progress with signal rockets. The assault group hit a mine field at a street intersection. They defused seven mines as well as a 250-kilogram aerial bomb rigged as a mine. The assault detachment advanced 1.5 kilometers when it was stopped by strong fire from a village. The fire came from dugouts cut in earth dikes of irrigation canals. Tank and BMP-2 fire suppressed the enemy fire. The company had two more men wounded during this advance.

In all, the company accomplished its mission in an hour and a half at the cost of three wounded. They killed seven mujahideen in close combat. By 1130 hours, the opposing guerrilla force was shattered. However, at 1400 our attempts to destroy another guerrilla force failed. We made a second unsuccessful attempt at dusk. With nightfall, the mujahideen managed to slip out of the blockade.

Frunze Commentary: In this example, a very large group of enemy was encircled, but the combat power was insufficient to destroy it. This was the result of poor intelligence which furnished insufficient information about the enemy and led to an insufficient force density in the blocking forces.

Nevertheless, good points included the rapid reconcentration of subunits from one direction to another, the powerful influence of firepower on the enemy, the proper reinforcement of the company and the skillful application of BM-21 fire to strengthen the morale of the flanking platoons which also strengthened the fighting spirit of the soldiers and officers.

Editor’s Commentary: The Soviets used MRLS (called katyusha or “little Kathryn”) in the direct fire role during World War II. The war in Afghanistan showed that it is still an effective way to shake up your opponent. Rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns are also very effective ground support weapons as are SP howitzers when used in direct fire. However, firepower is not an absolute substitute for maneuver and close combat. During the war in Afghanistan, like the United States in Vietnam, the Soviets chose to expend massive firepower in order to save Soviet lives and to compensate for their lack of infantry. It was an expensive, indiscriminate and, probably, ineffective practice.

Unlike World War II, the Soviet Army in Afghanistan does not push on despite heavy casualties. They transition to the defense after moderate casualties and call for fire support.

The Soviets assigned commands not so much by rank as by ability (or connections). Vignettes throughout this book show captains, majors and lieutenant colonels commanding battalions, senior lieutenants and captains commanding companies and captains and lieutenants commanding platoons. In this vignette, a senior lieutenant commands a company which has a captain as one of its platoon leaders. This captain could be a platoon leader as a punishment for some misdeed, or he could have been doing his normal job since wartime regulations allowed the army to carry a man in a position one grade higher than that authorized. Further, he might have just been promoted. In the peacetime Soviet Army, it was not unusual for higher-ranking officers to work for a lower-ranking officer. The position, to the Soviets, was more important than the rank. The Soviet military pay scale reflects this when it adds command or responsibility pay to an officer’s pay based on rank.