The simultaneous, headlong arrival of two airborne assault groups on the main peak took the mujahideen by surprise and they began to withdraw from their positions. The battalion commander called in artillery fire further into the enemy depths – primarily on the reverse slope of the peak and onto the path along which enemy reserves would be committed.
Major Petrov reported his situation and decision to the senior commander. He decided to continue the advance on the enemy in the area of the Satukandav Pass and strike the enemy on the flank and rear in order to control the pass.
Following an artillery preparation, the 1st Airborne Battalion and the “Commando” Battalion began the assault toward Satukandav Pass. The enemy had not expected the decisive attack and arrival of Soviet and Afghan forces at the main peak. The mujahideen lost the initiative. Part of the enemy force withdrew. The battalion advanced to the south under supporting artillery fire and did not allow the enemy to regain his composure.
The guerrilla forces defending the Satukandav Pass did not know the exact size of the Soviet and Afghan forces approaching on their flanks and rear. They began a hasty withdrawal, abandoning their crew-served weapons and ammunition at their firing positions.
Taking advantage of the panicked enemy withdrawal in the pass, the 1st Airborne Battalion captured the pass on the move and, along with the Afghan forces, dug in along their newly secured line.
This decisive and brave advance seized the prime defensive node which proved to be the key to the enemy defensive system – the Satukandav Pass.
Frunze Commentary: Analysis of combat in the initial stage of Operation “Magistral’” (November–December 1987) leads to the following conclusions:
1. Thorough knowledge of the situation, continual analysis, decisiveness, initiative and bravery are the basis for successful and informed mission fulfillment in combat.
2. Artful distribution of forces during an advance in mountains, careful coordination between combined arms subunits, and the constant support of artillery fires are the most important steps in such a successful operation.
3. Proper use of the protective characteristics of mountains along with constant reconnaissance will allow one to accomplish his mission with a minimum of personnel casualties.
4. Success in mountain combat under constantly changing conditions demands continuous troop control.
Editor’s Commentary: The dummy airborne drop was a masterful use of deception to discover enemy firing positions. Operation Magistral’ was the largest operation of the war and eventually involved large air assaults, attacks on different axes and the successful lifting of the siege of Khost. In this vignette, Operation Magistral’ massed the fires of an AAG and a DAG for a four-hour artillery preparation during the fight for the Satukandov Pass. The goal was complete destruction of the area by air and artillery and is far outside any Soviet artillery norms. This extensive artillery preparation still did not do the job. Nor did Magistral’. After the costly Operation Magistral’, the mujahideen once again cut off Khost and again put it under siege (a constant feature since 1981).
18. Storming Spinakalacha village
by LTC V. D. Vlasyan19
From 21–26 December 1987, a strong enemy force overran a series of security outposts in the Daman region. This area was the responsibility of an Army Corps of the Army of the Republic of Afghanistan.20 As a result, the enemy began freely moving arms and weapons into the Kandahar region. Two battalions of a Soviet Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade were unable to restore the situation.21
At 2000 hours on 27 December, our division commander, General-Major Uchkin, called me in and gave me my orders. At the time, I was a major and commanded a motorized rifle battalion. He ordered me to take my battalion on a 500-kilometer road march to Kandahar.22 My battalion had to be in the Spinakalacha combat area by the morning of 31 December. I was to seal off the Spinakalacha village from the major supply bases and create conditions which would allow the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade to recapture lost positions. In the course of preparing for our road march and ensuing combat, I added extra ammunition, water, fuel and rations to what we usually carried and picked up some reinforcing subunits. At 0400 hours 29 December, my battalion moved out to accomplish its mission.
At 1600 hours 30 December, we arrived in Kandahar. There, I was met by General-Major R. K. Pishchev, the Deputy commander of the 40th Army. He gave me specific orders. We were to enter the contested area at 1100 hours 31 December and assault and capture Spinakalacha village by 1500 hours. We were then to seal off the canyon and hold this area until 7 January 1988. During that time, an Afghan regiment23 would fortify the area and assume responsibility for the area defended by my 2nd MRB.
Map 18: Storming Spinakalacha village, 31 December 1987.
At 1100 hours, I put my battalion on the road flanked by security patrols. As we entered the area, we began battle and I lost two KIA and three WIA. By 1210 hours, I assembled the bulk of my battalion 1.5 kilometers south of Spinakalacha. From 1220 until 1240, I conducted a personal reconnaissance, finalized my plans for the assault groups and finalized air and artillery coordination. I reported my plan to the senior commander at 1240.
Ten minutes later, my reconnaissance platoon began to climb mountain ridge from the west to destroy enemy security outposts on dominant terrain and on the canyon approaches and the approaches to Spinakalacha village. During their advance, the reconnaissance patrol uncovered a launch-bomb cache with 150 launch bombs and two launchers. The patrol rigged the cache for detonation and proceeded up the hill where they could secure the left flank of the assault detachment. At 1320 hours, the patrol attacked and destroyed an enemy outpost and established solid communications with me.
At 1320 hours, I signalled the start of an artillery preparation. A 152mm SP howitzer battalion, a separate 122mm SP howitzer battalion and a MRLS battalion participated in a 10-minute artillery preparation. This was immediately followed by a bombing and strafing attack by two squadrons of SU-25 FROGFOOT ground-attack aircraft.
At 1335 hours, my 5th MRC moved out to its jumping-off point some 250 meters from the village. The 5th MRC was commanded by Captain В. M. Mikul’skiy. The 5th MRC was configured as Assault Group #1. It had 46 men, including a squad of sappers, and eight BMP-2s. I added a tank with a mine plow and an Afghan infantry company of 40 men to this company. As the 5th MRC moved out, I covered its movement with the fires of a sniper squad, a flamethrower platoon, an AGS-17 platoon and a mortar battery. At 1340 hours, I had the MRLS battalion lay down a smoke screen to blind the enemy.
At 1340 hours, my subunits attacked Spinakalacha. We met strong resistance on the right flank and the Afghan army company withdrew to the jumping-off area. I was not able to get them to come back and they did nothing further toward accomplishing our mission. The enemy began to shift his forces to his left flank in order to put flanking fire on the 5th MRC. For a while, we were held back by the thick adobe walls of the village. Then, however, my troops were able to blow gaps in the adobe walls and my platoons burst through these gaps in three-man groups on the attack. My 5th MRC faced the enemy main force.
At 1355 hours, my 4th MRC (Assault Group #2) attacked on the battalion’s left flank. The 4th MRC, commanded by Captain Yu. A. Shalkin, broke the enemy defense and destroyed his covering forces guarding the entrance to the canyon. One of his platoons was able to hit the enemy in the rear which helped the 5th MRC’s fight. Two more 4th MRC platoons grabbed the western edge of the village and established blocking positions. At 1500 hours, these platoons got into a firefight with mujahideen who were retreating into the mountains.