a patrol schedule;

a duty weapon schedule and sectors of fire;²²

signal tables;

observer’s journals, combat journals and journals of enemy activities.

The battalion produces the security plan which shows the number and composition of each security outpost, the quantity of vehicles, weapons and ammunition at each security outpost, the security belt at each outpost, the defensive plan for key sites, the coordination measures between elements, the defensive fire plan, the signal plan for communication between garrisons, convoys, dispatch posts and the fire support elements. In addition, the battalion had a shift schedule for its subunits and also the battalion commander’s order for organization of the security zone. Subunits had their TO&E equipment plus additional radios, telephones and cable communication gear for command and control.

Radio is the primary mean of communications in LOC security. All armored vehicles, TO&E and attached subunits and passing convoys monitor a common channel. The battalion reconnaissance platoon is located close to the battalion command post. Its function is to cut off and destroy any groups of mujahideen in the battalion AOR. They usually do this by setting up ambushes on sites where mujahideen could approach the highway. Their ambush site is coordinated with the regiment’s ambush plan and usually lasts one night. There have been times, however, when the ambush party has stayed on site for three days.

Editor’s Commentary: The Soviet concept of LOC security appears to have been to establish a series of fortified positions, man them and then sit back and wait. This is a very passive, reactive posture. There is no aggressive patrolling or reconnaissance. Again, the Soviets used their reconnaissance force as a primary combat force and not for gathering intelligence. There seems to be no attempt to shift forces, occupy temporary sites and take actions to deceive or “wrong-foot” the enemy. The mujahideen could easily collect against this scheme and take appropriate actions to avoid or overcome it.

Next: Chapter 5: March and Convoy Escort

Footnotes

1. The Soviets see a big difference between a defensive position and a security post. They defend when they are in immediate danger of being overwhelmed and when the correlation of forces is against them. A security outpost is a control measure which incorporates defensive measures as combat multipliers (ed.). [return]

2. S. V. Milyuk served in the OKSVA from January 1980 through June 1981 as a platoon leader. He was awarded the medal “For Excellence in Military Service” First Class. [return]

3. The 860th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment was garrisoned in Faizabad. Its 1st Battalion was garrisoned in Khamrabad (Baharak) and, later, its 3rd Battalion was garrisoned in Kishim. The action takes place in the 1st Battalion area (ed.). [return]

4. When in use, the electrically-powered turret of the BMP rapidly drains energy from the vehicle. Therefore, during alerts and combat, the BMP engine must be kept running in order to keep the battery charged and provide adequate voltage to the turret (ed.). [return]

5. Soviet trip flares are not merely ground flares which illuminate the area. Soviet trip flares contain multiple green, yellow and red rockets which fire into the air and produce a whistling sound. These trip flares (more precisely signal mines – signal ‘nye miny) draw the sleepiest sentry’s attention with repeated lights and sounds (ed.). [return]

6. S. V. Mos’kin served in the OKSVA from September 1980 through November 1982 as a platoon leader. [return]

7. The 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion, 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were mounted on BTRs while the 3rd Battalion was mounted on BMPs (ed.). [return]

8. I. A. Egiazarov served in the OKSVA from 1982 through 1984 as the commander of a SPETSNAZ group. He was awarded the medal “For Military Merit.” [return]

9. A SPETSNAZ detachment is equivalent to a battalion command, although its personnel strength was less than 100. They are sometimes called SPETSNAZ companies. SPETSNAZ groups were equivalent to company commands, but had a personnel strength of 15–16 men or less. Some were four-man groups. They were sometimes called SPETSNAZ platoons (ed.). [return]

10. The 31st SPETSNAZ Group of the 177th SPETSNAZ Detachment (ed.). [return]

11. This Soviet tanglefoot obstacle is different than that used in western armies. It is a large, compressed, banded spring made of high-quality wire. It is similar to an uncontrolled “Slinky” toy. When unbanded during set up, it uncoils wildly in every direction. It will stop dismounted soldiers, animals, vehicles and even tanks. It is almost impossible to extricate anything from this without heavy-duty wire cutters, pliers and lots of time. These obstacles are called MZP (malozametnye prepyatstviya) or concealed obstacles (ed.). [return]

12. F. V. Zhitoryuk served in the OKSVA in 1985 as a battalion commander. [return]

13. Most likely the 177th MRR of the 108th MRD (ed.). [return]

14. F. V. Zhitoryuk served in the OKSVA in 1985 as a battalion commander. [This is the same author of the last vignette.) (ed.)]. [return]

15. V. G. Serebryakov served in the OKSVA from May 1986 through June 1988 as an airborne battalion commander. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Banner”, the “Order of the Red Star”, and the Afghan “Order of the Red Banner”. [return]

16. This and the following vignette are not part of the Frunze book. They are extracts from P. Alexseev’s “Okhranenie” [Security], Voyenny vestnik [Military herald], April 1994, p. 42–46. Colonel Alexseev is on the faculty of the Frunze Department of the History of Military Art. He apparently used LTC Yunakov’s report that was in the Frunze Afghanistan archives. Although both examples lack the element of combat, they show how base camp and LOC security were organized (ed.). [return]

17. Probably the 5th Motorized Rifle Battalion, 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. The article (which is riddled with typographical errors) says the 2nd Battalion, but this is unlikely (ed.). [return]

18. The 3rd Battalion of either the 180th or 181st Motorized Rifle Regiments, 108th Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). [return]

19. The ZSU-23-2. These 23mm machine guns could fire 2,000 rounds per minute and could be mounted on a truck bed or BTR (ed.). [return]

20. There is no single Afghan language. Pushtu and Dari are the official languages, while Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Baluchi, Turkmen, and Arabic are also spoken (ed.). [return]

21. The combat load [boekomplekt] is a logistic planning term which differs from the U.S. “basic load”. Five combat loads is a significant amount – probably enough for six good fights (ed.). [return]

22. Duty weapons were manned, crew-served weapons in temporary positions. Only these weapons would engage enemy reconnaissance or probing elements while the rest of the force moved to battle positions. The duty weapons would then move to battle positions. Enemy return fire would be on the temporary position and the enemy knowledge of the locations of defending Soviet crew-served weapons would be faulty (ed.). [return]

Chapter 5:

March and Convoy Escort

Side by side with the mission of destroying guerrilla forces, the Soviet forces had a mission of delivering cargo and escorting convoys. Analysis of enemy tactics shows that during the first years of the war, the enemy hit convoys mainly by mining isolated stretches of road. During the later years of the war, the enemy became far more focused on the convoys and used special diversionary groups to attack the convoys physically.