We killed 38 mujahideen. The search group captured a large amount of weapons, ammunition, and large-caliber rounds. The sappers blew up the weapons and equipment that we could not carry off. The company successfully withdrew to a mount site where they mounted their BTRs and moved back to the battalion base camp. Two of our soldiers were slightly wounded.

Frunze Commentary: This vignette shows the use of artillery to provide battlefield illumination for an ambush. Uninterrupted communication and coordination with the artillery battalion ensured the success of the subunits in the ambush. The company commander correctly determined the probable enemy route of withdrawal and selected this site to emplace his minefield.

Editor’s Commentary: Again, reconnaissance forces are used for combat and not reconnaissance. Reconnaissance seems to be a secondary function. Yet, the lack of good tactical reconnaissance seems to have been a weakness of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Once again, the Soviets use the bronegruppa for extrication of the force. The ambush party used a good covered approach through the woods and gully to the ambush site. The question is why the ambush site was located where it was, if the mujahideen had three possible routes in the area and the route junction was near at hand. Why didn’t the commander put the ambush there, or at least put some observers at the junction and plan some RDM fires on the site? The Soviets established ambush positions on both sides of the wood-line. This seems like a good idea. Were all positions fully manned or were they merely sited so that forces could shift between them?

49. Conducting an ambush on the Yakpay Mountain Pass

by LTC V. I. Korotkikh²⁴

During the spring and summer of 1987, guerrilla forces increased their attacks on government and Soviet forces. To support this combat, the mujahideen leaders increased their deliveries of weapons and ammunition from Pakistan. The deliveries would start at the Pakistan border with caravans of some 300 pack animals. Later, these would break into caravans of 15–20 animals which would cross the mountain passes to the guerrilla base camps.

By this time, the mujahideen knew Soviet reconnaissance and SPETSNAZ subunits’ tactics well and used this knowledge to good advantage. Thus, if their caravan was traveling during the day and was approaching a likely ambush site, the mujahideen would block the pass before-hand and hold it for two or three hours until the caravan passed through. The mujahideen would post two or three armed lookouts every 200 or 300 meters on the pass. The caravan would then come through in groups of 15–20 pack animals, with an hour between groups, until they had all crossed this dangerous area.

If the caravan were to approach a pass at night, they would send out one or two unarmed patrols at twilight. These patrols were disguised as shepherds and often accompanied by children. The caravan would start to move when it became dark. Five to seven men, armed with rifles, would move forward as a reconnaissance patrol. The caravan moved behind this patrol. Drovers, armed with pistols or assault rifles, moved between every two pack animals. A rear security force of two to three men, armed with small arms, moved behind the caravan.

Based on this situation, the high command decided to increase our ambush activity. On 27 August 1987, I was ordered to select a group from my battalion to conduct ambushes in Yakpay Pass in Paktia Province.²⁵ My commander gave me the order to move out at night to the area of Yakpay Pass and to conduct ambushes there from 28 August to 2 September to destroy a caravan. The distance from our base camp to the pass was 12 kilometers. I was the ambush commander. My 45-man party included 12 scouts from the recon platoon, 24 air-assault troopers from one of my companies, and up to two men each from my signal platoon, the sapper company and the chemical defense platoon. I also took the surgeon and the battalion’s physician’s assistant.

At 2030 hours on 28 August 1987, my group moved out for the ambush site. A three-man patrol with night binoculars moved out in front. The main body followed the patrol in a single column. By 0230 hours 29 August, my group finished its ascent and went into a day laager some 1.5 kilometers from the pass. I established two lookout posts. Toward evening, these posts spotted a caravan moving toward the guerrilla base camp.

Map 49: Ambush on the Yakpay Mountain Pass.

The caravan settled into a village. At twilight, my ambush group moved rapidly into the pass, took up ambush positions and got ready for combat. However, after we waited until 0200 hours 30 August, I decided that the caravan would not come through the pass that night. I decided to take my force back to the day laager, pick up the material that we had cached there and move further down into the pass.

During the day of 30 August, we continued to observe the area. During the afternoon, we spotted 30 armed mujahideen moving toward the pass. After they climbed the mountain, they began to establish posts in the pass. It was clear that the stretch of pass I had chosen to ambush would not do. I conferred with the recon platoon leader and then decided to put the ambush in a different place. To do so, it was necessary to move five kilometers in an uninterrupted bound. I called my unit commander on the radio, reported my situation and advised him of my decision.

I ordered my force to move to the new site and we set out at 1800 hours. We reached the new site at 2330 hours. During the next 10 to 15 minutes, I fine-tuned the plan and coordinated the group’s actions while the personnel got into firing positions. After a few minutes, a caravan started to move up from the valley. A six-man patrol moved in front of the caravan. We let it pass. When the caravan was in the kill zone, I gave the signal and my men opened fire. My illumination group fired off parachute flares to illuminate the kill zone. We destroyed the caravan within a few minutes. We killed 14 mujahideen, captured two others and seized 15 pack animals loaded with arms, ammunition and medicine. Our sappers blew up the captured ammunition.

I reported our ambush results by radio to my brigade commander. He ordered us to withdraw to an area where our BTRs would pick us up at 0800 hours. We took the prisoners, weapons and documents; linked up with our BTRs at the appointed time; and returned to our unit base camp.

Frunze Commentary: In this example, the bravery and initiative displayed by the commander should be noted. He skillfully evaluated the situation, made the decision to change ambush sites, and in a short time organized it in another area. He constituted a special illumination group to provide light so that aimed fire could be placed on the enemy.

Editor’s Commentary: The commander took both a surgeon and a medical assistant along on the ambush. The Soviets rediscovered that slight wounds at high altitude can rapidly turn fatal. Medical evacuation by helicopters in these areas was problematic and often wounded soldiers had to be carried to lower altitudes for MEDEVAC helicopters to pick them up. Wounded soldiers sometimes could not survive the hours needed to reach treatment centers.

Next: Chapter 7: And in Conclusion…

Footnotes

1. V. I. Pavlenko served in the OKSVA from 1980 through 1982 as a motorized rifle company commander. He was awarded the medal “For Bravery”. [This medal was given to enlisted men and junior lieutenants only (ed.).] [return]

2. The 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). [return]

3. V. P. Gladishev served in the OKSVA from February 1982 through June 1984. He served as the deputy commander and then the commander of an airborne battalion. He was awarded the “Order of the Red Star”. [return]