This is not an exhaustive study of the training and conduct of battle by the Soviet battalions and regiments in Afghanistan. Rather, it is a collection of material which describes and analyzes individual combat episodes.

Footnotes

1. Here the Russian text employs the generic terms subunits (podrazdelenie) and units (chasti). I put them into Western equivalent (ed.). [return]

Chapter 1:

Blocking and Destroying Guerilla Forces

Research on the combat experience acquired by the Soviet forces in Afghanistan showed that one of the fundamental methods for fulfilling combat missions was to block off a region in which guerrilla forces were located and then to thoroughly comb the region to find and destroy the mujahideen.

Successful accomplishment of this task required thorough preparation of personnel and weapons for combat; skillful coordination between the blocking and combing forces, their bronegruppa,¹ artillery and aviation; the application of military cunning and the application of reasoned initiatives; and the brave and decisive actions of the commander and personnel. Excellent results were achieved by suddenly blocking-off those regions which had been the site of military activity several days prior.

1. An airborne battalion searches Sherkhankhel village

by Major S. N. Petrov²

In the spring of 1982, guerrilla forces began combat activities in Parvan Province. Guerrillas hit our convoys, outposts and separate groups of soldiers. They regularly shelled the Bagram airport and the base camp of our airborne regiment. Intelligence reports indicated that a well-armed group of approximately 40 mujahideen were operating out of Sherkhankhel village.

The airborne regiment commander received orders to destroy this guerrilla force. Preparations for combat were rapidly completed. Sufficient ammunition for three days combat was issued to every paratrooper and two combat loads of ammunition were loaded onto the combat vehicles. The regimental commander personally inspected the battalion’s readiness.

Map 1: The sweep of Sherkhankhel village on 20 March 1980.

The 3rd Airborne Battalion commander planned to move his battalion secretly to the Sherkhankhel region and to seal it off with two companies of paratroopers while a third company would search the village. One airborne company would remain in reserve. An artillery battalion and four Mi-24 helicopter gunships would provide support with the initiation of combat.

In the pre-dawn hours of 20 March, the battalion moved out from Bagram to Sherkhankhel. A reconnaissance patrol moved 300 meters in front of the column. The approach march moved on a wide, straight road. Along the left side of the road stretched a thick, high, long adobe wall while on the right side lay a concrete lined canal which was five meters wide and two-and-a-half meters deep. Suddenly, through an embrasure cut in the adobe wall, and practically at point-blank range, the enemy opened fire on the reconnaissance patrol. The survivors scrambled for safety into the canal. A machine gun opened fire from a house 150 meters further north from the ambush site. The battalion column halted and the battalion commander called in artillery and helicopter support.

The battalion finally began to maneuver its reserve company in an effort to encircle the enemy, but only after the mujahideen ceased fire. But even this attempt was stopped by a veritable hurricane of enemy fire. The mujahideen used the system of karez³ to successfully break contact and withdraw. There was no thought of conducting a pursuit or continuing the action. The 3rd Airborne Battalion lost eight men killed and six wounded. Two of the dead were officers. The battalion did not search the village since the mujahideen were already gone. Instead, the battalion returned to its base camp.

Frunze Commentary: In spite of our measures to prepare for combat secretly, the enemy was able to determine the intention of Soviet tactical elements. Exploiting the arrogance of the battalion commander, the enemy hit him with an ambush. The battalion’s subunits, which were prepared to conduct a sweep, conducted an approach march along a single march route which was so constricted as to prevent maneuver by the subunits. The battalion commander merely put a reconnaissance patrol to his front and did not consider using flanking patrols.

Editor’s Commentary: Operations security is difficult, particularly when fighting on someone else’s turf and working with an indigenous force which may not be 100% on your side. Yet operations security is absolutely imperative for preserving your force and winning battles. In this vignette, the regimental commander thoroughly inspected his force prior to its moving out. This sounds like a good idea, however, this was the dread stroevoy smotr [ceremonial inspection] which was an unwelcome part of peace-time, garrison soldiering in the Soviet Army. The entire regiment would lay out all its equipment on the parade ground. All equipment would be laid out on tarps in front of the vehicles. Every piece of equipment would be formally checked and accounted for, the correct spacing on uniform items would be checked with a template, and displays would be aligned with pieces of string. The process could take three days. Although inspections are good ideas, these massive formal inspections were almost always conducted before a planned action. Any mujahideen in the vicinity were tipped off that an action was pending and could sound the warning. This Soviet pattern often compromised operational security. In this vignette, the mujahideen definitely were warned and punished the careless Soviet force. The stroevoy smotr may have been part of the Soviet problem.

2. Searching a populated area in the Charikar Valley

by LTC A. L Makkoveev⁴

Throughout the winter of 1980, Kabul and the surrounding provinces were quiet and there was no combat in this region. However, with the arrival of spring, organized guerrilla groups initiated an active campaign.

I commanded the 7th Motorized Rifle Company⁵ which was mounted on BMPs. On the morning of 21 July, I was given the mission to conduct a road march from Kabul to Charikar and then reinforce one of the mountain rifle battalions which would conduct a deep raid and search.

Preparations for combat began in garrison. The company had 100% fill in personnel, weapons and equipment. We carried three days worth of dry rations⁶ and the vehicles were topped-off with POL. After a thorough inspection, I reported to my battalion commander that we were ready for combat.

We completed our road march to the AO (area of operations) of the 3rd Mountain Rifle Battalion. That evening, the battalion commander, Captain Yu. P. Levintas, explained the 3rd Battalion mission and instructed me to prepare my company to move in the main body of the battalion along a designated route and search all the nearby villages.

At 0500 hours on 22 July, the 3rd Mountain Rifle Battalion, reinforced by my 7th Motorized Rifle Company, moved out. Riding on our combat vehicles allowed us to overcome many natural obstacles. At one stage of our advance, I dismounted my company. While we were dismounted, I received the order to search a nearby village and, following the search, to take the road [which ran through the village] to rejoin the battalion main body. I dispatched a squad-sized patrol to establish a defensive position at the entrance to the village. I wanted the squad to cover the company as it deployed. On the outskirts of the village, I established firing positions for the machine gun/grenade launcher platoon.⁷ The company then descended from the heights, formed into a line and combed the village, searching the houses and basements. After two hours, we finished the search and the company assembled on the road to exit the village.