The detachment conducted further raids which combed outlying villages and canyons. But, again the mujahideen had successfully withdrawn and the battalion swept empty blocks and areas.

Frunze Commentary: Military experience shows that three basic tasks must be fulfilled to conduct a successful block and sweep. First, preliminary reconnaissance must disclose the location of the guerrilla forces as well as their composition and probable course of action. Second, the maneuverability of the guerrilla force must be constrained – tactical air assault landings and raiding groups must deny all paths and routes of withdrawal to the enemy and prevent his disengagement from the strike of the blocking groups. Third, the enemy must be destroyed by the main sweeping force or by a frontal attack. The unsuccessful accomplishment of any one of these tasks resulted in a failed mission. Combat experience demonstrated that it is necessary to establish close contact with the enemy, pin him down by battle while simultaneously maneuvering blocking forces into position, and then surrounding and destroying his guerrilla force. It is absolutely essential to search for the enemy, and this requires the effective utilization of reconnaissance forces. In order to successfully accomplish their combat mission, subunits need to be expeditiously divided into search, support, and fire support groups and the main body.

Editor’s Commentary: The commander fought the mujahideen rear guard and made no efforts to pin the main body of the guerrilla force in place, cut off its escape route and aggressively outmaneuver it. The commander did not use his reconnaissance, fought his way through in a by-the-numbers manner, and did nothing to accomplish the mission rapidly. Sweeping an area without first posting blocking forces is, at best, a waste of time and a good way to get one’s nose repeatedly bloodied. The commander showed little initiative and less field sense. Originally, this was the lead-off example to the book, but it was so weak that I moved it. I left it in as a prime example of the problems of the Soviet Army in 1980 in Afghanistan. Their army was trained for the European battlefield and was unable initially to cope with this new environment. Tactical commanders lacked initiative and the mujahideen took advantage of this.

Soviet commanders used their reconnaissance forces for combat and did not restrict them to reconnaissance missions. Reconnaissance forces were better trained and motivated than motorized rifle forces, but their casualty rate must have been much higher. The misuse of reconnaissance forces may have also been dictated by the fact that there were not enough Soviet forces in-country to do the job. Soviet field units were often chronically under-strength.

Finally, the Bamian in this example is not the province capital of Bamian province, which was controlled by government forces throughout the war and which is not on the road to Termez, but approximately 150 kilometers to the east of it.

5. Blocking and searching the green zone of the Arghandab River

by LTC S. V. Zelenskiy¹²

In October 1982, our reconnaissance learned that 10 guerrilla forces with a total strength of approximately 350 men were operating north of Kandahar city in the “green zone” bordering the Arghandab River. This fertile “green zone” stretches for 15–20 kilometers along the northern bank of the river and is up to seven kilometers wide. It is an agricultural region of gardens and vineyards bisected by a network of irrigation ditches. It is practically impassible for vehicles.

The brigade¹³ received an order to destroy these mujahideen. The commander’s concept was to seal off the north with the bronegruppa of three battalions. Helicopter gunship patrols would fly patrol patterns to seal off the south and the east.

Two motorized rifle battalions and an air assault battalion would search the area from the west to detect and destroy the enemy. An artillery battalion would support the action.

The force moved to its assembly areas and designated positions at night. By 0500 hours 6 October, the battalions’ bronegruppa had all occupied their designated positions, the dismounted troops had closed in their assembly areas, the artillery battalion had occupied their firing positions and were prepared to conduct firing missions, and the helicopters were on station and flying their standing patrols.

Map 5: Block and search of a green zone along the Argandab River.

At 0530 hours, the brigade commander gave the signal and the force began their sweep on a wide front. The 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion was on the left, the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion was in the center and the air assault battalion was on the right flank. Almost immediately, an irregular group of five to seven men began long-range small-arms fire on our forces and then withdrew to the northeast. Our subunits went in pursuit of them.

At 1600 hours, the 2nd Air Assault Company, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Dyuby, made contact with approximately 40 mujahideen. The enemy was deployed in a well-organized defense occupying about a kilometer of frontage. The battalion commander ordered the right-flank 1st Air Assault Company to “envelop from the right the enemy force which is defending in front of the 2nd Company. Block the enemy route of withdrawal to the northeast. Prepare to destroy the enemy in concert with the 2nd Company.”

I was a senior lieutenant at the time and commanded the 1st Air Assault Company. It took me a half hour to form up my platoons and begin the maneuver. During this time, the 2nd Company sustained casualties, but the enemy began to withdraw. By 1700 hours, I had maneuvered my platoons into blocking positions covering a mujahideen breakout to the northeast. I personally positioned each platoon behind adobe walls working consecutively from the southeast to the north. When I finished positioning my forces, my command post element and I were at the extreme right flank of my position. I had seven soldiers, including myself, in the command group.

Before I could reposition, approximately 70 enemy soldiers approached my command post. My six soldiers and I took the enemy under fire. At that point, I lost radio communications with both battalion headquarters and my subordinate platoons. However, I still had radio contact with brigade headquarters. The brigade commander demanded the exact coordinates of my position in order to call in artillery fire. However, I was unable to determine my precise location. I could only give an approximate location which I felt would be accurate to within 50 meters. The artillery refused to shoot the mission without more precise data.

The enemy force attacked three times. During the third assault, the command post was running out of ammunition. Each member of the command group, at my direction, simultaneously threw a grenade and broke contact with the enemy and withdrew to the first platoon position. Even when we had joined forces with the first platoon, we did not pursue the enemy because of his clear numerical superiority.

Enemy losses were 20 killed. My company had no casualties.

Frunze Commentary: From this local episode, one can evaluate the following characteristic features associated with a larger brigade-size block and search action:

using helicopters to seal off areas;

tight coordination between subunits;

skillful leadership and the ability to make the right decisions on the battlefield;

initiative and steadfastness by our conscript soldiers at the command post of the air assault company;

failure of communications;

the absence of platoon leaders’ initiative (a significant battle was taking place to their right, yet the platoon leaders kept their platoons in their positions awaiting orders from the company commander); and,