(2004)

To grow, Google needed investment capital, but its growth forced a difficult decision. In 2003, Google passed the five-hundred-shareholder mark, and federal regulations stipulate that a year after reaching this threshold companies had either to offer their shares for sale or open their books. Either way, the innards of the Google rocket would be revealed. Page and Brin didn’t want to go public, said Schmidt; they were fearful of revealing to competitors proprietary information and the company’s true trajectory, but also of having to cope with what they considered the short-term mania of Wall Street. They abhorred the idea of doling out fees to investment banking advisers, of going on road shows to sell their story to investors, of allowing Wall Street to set the initial stock price-in short, of doing things the usual way.

The founders knew an initial public offering of stock was necessary, but they refused to listen to the experts, or to Schmidt and the three other board members: John Doerr, Michael Moritz, and Ram Shriram. They approached the IPO as if it were a science problem, with Page and Brin crafting their own solution. Instead of allowing bankers to arbitrarily set the floor price of the stock or allocate shares at a predetermined price to favored clients, the founders came up with a more egalitarian method. They would run an auction similar to the one Google used to sell advertising. Google would set a floor price, and anyone who made an online bid that matched or exceeded it could acquire a minimum of five shares. Instead of paying the usual 7 percent fee to Wall Street underwriters who were necessary to sell stock, they would cut this fee to about 3 percent. And to protect what they saw as Google’s “core values” and maintain a long-term focus, they would implement a dual class stock ownership. The class A shares sold to the public would receive one vote; the class B shares, retained by the founders and by Schmidt and senior managers, would receive ten votes per share, and would comprise 61.4 percent of the voting power.

When the founders proposed this stock structure, Doerr and Moritz objected, and strenuously. Like many on Wall Street, the two board members recoiled at the thought of treating some shareholders as second-class citizens, and of potentially insulating management from accountability to shareholders. “It seemed to me vaguely undemocratic,” said Doerr. Shriram was caught in the middle. “I didn’t want to take a position until we reached agreement on the board,” he said. The VCs had another concern, said a participant in these discussions, about the precedent this might set with their other start-up clients. But the founders had done due diligence, consulting with Barry Diller, who serves on the board of the Washington Post Company, which, like the New York Times Company, has two classes of stock. Diller noted that other companies, including Warren Buffett’s Berk shire Hathaway, also have dual voting stock.

The founders were unbending, and Coach Campbell was called upon to help coax Doerr and Moritz to go along. To be even more transparent about their intent, Page and Brin decided to prepare “A Letter from the Founders,” to accompany the SEC filing. Written by Page, the letter began, “Google is not a conventional company. We do not intend to become one.” To ensure Google’s continued creativity and focus on users, rather than investors, they would be unconcerned with “quarterly market expectations,” did not “expect to pay any dividends,” and would not partake in the usual corporate ritual of offering “earnings guidance” by predicting quarterly performance. “A management team distracted by a series of short-term targets is as pointless as a dieter stepping on a scale every half-hour,” the letter declared. They would make big investment bets, even if these only had “a 10% chance of earning a billion dollars over the long term.” They would continue to “run Google as a triumvirate,” even though this management structure “is unconventional.”

They minced no words about the implications of this stock structure: “The main effect of this structure is likely to leave our team, especially Sergey and me, with increasingly significant control over the company’s decisions and fate, as Google’s shares change hands.” They were also telegraphing that the two founders, who together owned 32 percent of the shares, were more equal partners than Schmidt (who owned 6.1 percent), or Doerr, Moritz, and Shriram (with 8.7, 9.9, and 2.2 percent respectively). Years later, Page described his and Brin’s motivation: “We were concerned in going public that we would have to change the way we operated, compromise our principles. It ended up being a good way of stating upfront the kinds of things we were thinking about and making sure that everybody who was participating was comfortable. By going public you take on a lot of shareholders, and the shareholders obviously have some amount of rights. But we, who are running the company, also have some degree of rights. We felt like it was better to be explicit… and allow us to be able to do the kinds of things we wanted to do.” While candid, the letter could have used the skill set of someone with a liberal arts education; say, an editor. Eight times in six pages they repeat a variation of the same messianic vow: to make “the world a better place.”

When Google announced it was going public in the spring of 2004, it had to disclose its finances in an SEC filing. As Google’s director of global communications and public affairs, David Krane said reporters suddenly realized, “Holy shit, this is a business story we missed here!” Krane and his then boss, Cindy McCaffrey, were bombarded with queries, but because SEC rules require a “quiet period” from companies between the time they file and the time their stock goes on sale, they could not answer. Reporters would call and say, “I need to talk to Sergey. I need to talk to Larry. I need to talk to Eric.” The pressure “to get the Google story” was intense. Once, Krane spotted a photographer hiding behind a bush at the Googleplex, hoping to snap a picture of the founders.

On the eve of the auction, there was rampant speculation about the price the stock would fetch. On the day of the offering, August 19, Page did a highly unusual thing: he wore a suit, not his usual black T-shirt and jeans. He and Schmidt had flown overnight to New York to open trading on the NASDAQ floor. They were accompanied by investment bankers and a team of about ten Google executives, including Marissa Mayer. They went back to Morgan Stanley and watched, rapt, as their stock was traded, rising one minute, falling the next. They had suggested in their IPO a floor price of eighty-five dollars, but were hoping to better that. They were now engaged in a spectator sport, one with enormous personal financial consequences. “Will it break one hundred dollars? Will it break one hundred dollars? I kept asking,” said Mayer. She and Page and Schmidt and the others were mesmerized by the Morgan Stanley trader who spoke so fast to those on the trading floor that the Googlers found him unintelligible. They watched him finally coax the stock to settle in at one hundred dollars. At last, he rose from his chair and, as if he had put a baby to sleep, calmly told them, “It likes to trade at one hundred dollars.”

Page, Schmidt, Mayer, and David Krane hopped into a waiting SUV that took them to Google’s New York offices, which were then on West Fortieth Street. As soon as the car doors closed, recalled Mayer, Page pulled out his cell phone and announced, “I’m going to call my mom!” The others pulled theirs out and chorused, “I’m going to call my mom!” When they got to Google’s offices, Page and Schmidt and Mayer went back to work, meeting for ninety minutes with a team of engineers.