It is interesting to note that Harrer and his companion set out for Lhasa just after the war was over. So it was not the escape from the British but the "lure of the Forbidden City" that encouraged them (86-87). In the tradition of previous travelers to Lhasa, Harrer describes his first sight of the golden roofs of Potala: "This moment compensated us for much. We felt inclined to go down on our knees like the pilgrims and touch the ground with our forehead" (113).

Though the representational strategies of idealization and self-criticism are dominant, Harrer's attitude is full of ambiguity. He writes of his infuriation with the "fatalistic resignation" (145) with which Tibetans lent themselves to backbreaking toil (they did not use the wheel) and is scathing about the Tibetan government's attitude toward modern medicine, hygiene, and sanitation. He writes disparagingly of the prevalence of venereal disease and homosexuality (186). Yet he "did not miss the appliances of Western civilization. Europe with its life of turmoil seemed far away" (156). While pondering whether progress in the form of a motor road to India would be good, he thinks, "One should not force a people to introduce inventions which are far ahead of their stage of evolution… Tibetan culture and way of life more than compensates for the advantages of modern techniques" (185; emphasis added). The admirable aspects of Tibetan culture, for Harrer, include the "perfect courtesy of the people" and "cultivated and elegant" upper-class women. In his more recent Return to Tibet (1985), Harrer provides an even more nostalgic account of Tibet as a surrogate society: "Would it not be marvellous if our young people could also possess their land of mystery and magic, their Shangri-La, a goal they would exert their best efforts to attend?" (173). He affirms that this Shangri-la for him was Tibet.

In its film version, Seven Years in Tibet (1997) loses almost all its ambiguity. It becomes the story of Harrer, a self-centered and individualistic Westerner, who is transformed in Tibet. Superlatives abound in descriptions of Tibet-"roof of the world," "highest country on earth," "most isolated," "medieval stone fortress towering in the centre of Asia," and so on. In Seven Years in Tibet the people of Lhasa "casually offer pearls of wisdom about the harmony of Tibet in comparison to the West" (Hansen 2001, 105): one Tibetan says, "We admire a man who abandons his ego, unlike you, who admire those who reach the top." Yet the movie, along with Martin Scorsese's Kundun (also see Frontline 1998a), played a crucial role in highlighting Tibet in the Western popular imagination. It brought to the attention of consumers of Hollywood that there is/was a place called Tibet. The film adaptation of Seven Years in Tibet follows a certain shift within Exotica Tibet-a conflation of the Dalai Lama with Tibet. While Tibet was clearly a set for an adventure for Harrer in the book, Brad Pitt as Harrer in the film is more humble and self-conscious, and the figure of the young Dalai Lama is particularly prominent.

Tibet as it emerged in the modern world as a geopolitical entity has been scripted in a tale combining imperialism, Orientalism, and nationalism. This chapter foregrounds the role of Western representations in the framing of the "identity of Tibet," that is, Tibet as a geopolitical entity. The West is not seen as an outsider in the "Tibet question" but as a constituent part of it. Specific Western conceptualizations of territoriality, practices of imperial diplomacy, and contemporary foreign policies have constructed the "Tibet" within the "Tibet question." [46] Through a historical analysis of the crucial role played by British imperialism in the framing of the Tibet question in terms of sovereignty and independence, this chapter brings into relief the constitutive relation between the discourse of sovereignty and the practice of representation. It argues that Tibet is not some prediscursive geographical entity but a place that is discursively constructed through imaginative practices of the various actors involved. [47] The chapter also briefly explores ways in which popular imaginations of Tibet have impacted the foreign policy of prominent Western states toward Tibet since the Chinese takeover in 1951.

The contemporary Chinese claim over Tibet is based on a version of Chinese history that sees the present-day nation-state as a successor to a longer history of Chinese civilization marked by a number of imperial phases. Tibet was historically linked with various Chinese empires and therefore the Chinese deem it part of modern China. What the exact nature of Tibet was within different empires in China is not considered a crucial factor, for what is important is that Tibet was subordinate to the Sino-centric empires. It is this historical subservience that underpins the argument asserting Chinese sovereignty over Tibet forever. On the other hand, Tibetans have argued that "Tibet was an independent, sovereign nation when the armies of the People's Republic of China ('PRC') entered Tibet in 1950. Tibet at that time presented all the attributes of statehood" (TPPRC 2000, 1). They seek to explain the traditional Sino-Tibetan relations in terms of principles that are not transferable into the modern notion of sovereignty. The personal, religious, and ambiguous nature of Sino-Tibetan relations is ridden roughshod over by the modern concept of sovereignty-China never had sovereignty over Tibet. All sides (Tibetans less so than the others) underplay the fact that sovereignty talk itself is alien to the traditional modes of interaction in the Sino-Tibetan world (Sperling 2004; see also Constantinou 1998).

The status of Tibet vis-a-vis China before 1951 has been articulated in terms of various concepts, including sovereignty, suzerainty, independence, indirect rule, autonomy, vassalage, protectorate, overlordship, and colony (for a range of views, see Chiu and Dreyer 1989; Government of Tibet in Exile n.d.; Petech 1950; Norbu 1990; Shakabpa 1984; Smith 1996; Van Praag 1987; Wang Jiawei and Nyima Gyaincain 1997; Wang Lixiong 2002). However, for the most part, it is sovereignty that is asserted and contested. On the one hand, the Chinese state marshals arguments buttressing its historical claim of sovereignty over Tibet; on the other, Tibetan exiles and their supporters make counter claims and assert that Tibet was for all practical purposes independent from China. Though both sides mobilize history to make their claims, the concept of sovereignty is often left unproblematized. This is not surprising as sovereignty is an "essentially uncontested concept" (Walker 1990, 159; for different perspectives on sovereignty, see Bartelson 1995; Biersteker and Weber 1996; Hannum 1990; Hinsley 1986; Hoffman 1998; James 1986; Krasner 1999; Shinoda 2000; Weber 1995).

Crucially, the revolutionary communist regime that took over China in 1949 had no qualms about staking claims in Tibet based on a debatable imperial legacy, which it had denounced in other spheres. There was no radical break from the past in making assertions over the boundary of China. The Chinese, who during the nineteenth century rejected the Western mode of international relations as alien, exerted their control over Tibet after 1950 using the absolutist modern European conception of sovereignty. Importantly, in the process it also ignored the different worldviews within which the Mongol and Manchu emperors interacted with Tibet (see Klieger 1994; Norbu 1990; Shakya 1999). Unlike the British, who used "suzerainty" and "autonomy" to designate Sino-Tibetan relations, since 1905 the Chinese have consistently argued that China's position is that of a sovereign and not a suzerain (see Carlson 2004, 2005). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, even though there is no space for "suzerainty" within international law and politics and all the states recognize the Chinese claim of "sovereignty" over Tibet, the pro-Tibet lobby contests this affirmation of sovereignty by highlighting the difference between suzerainty and sovereignty within international law. As Oppenheim argued: "Suzerainty is by no means sovereignty. It is a kind of international guardianship, since the vassal State is either absolutely or mainly represented internationally by the suzerain State" (in Van Praag 1987, 107).