By the start of the twentieth century, the undefined Tibet was no longer an unmapped land to the north of the Himalayas but had come to be perceived as a buffer state, a state that could act as a buffer against the new threat on the horizon-Russian imperial expansion in Central Asia. [49] Tibet acquired new importance within the "Great Game," and the British sought to have a friendly state to buffer British India from hostile forces in the north. Chinese imperial power was in decline and seen more as a nuisance.

At the start of the twentieth century, there were two phases in British India's policy toward Tibet, the watershed being Curzon's telegram of 8 January 1903. In the first phase, Curzon unsuccessfully tried a policy of direct approach, that is, of communicating with the Dalai Lama. That "the Dalai Lama had the temerity, one had almost say the cheek, to return the Indian Grand Mughal's letters unopened was sufficient cause, in Curzon's eyes, for a march to Lhasa, if only to show the Tibetan barbarians some elementary rules of human behaviour, of a code of (international) conduct!" (Mehra 1968, 360). Curzon pushed for a more active, confrontational policy.

The British Indian government informed the Home government, in a letter dated 13 February 1902,

The policy of isolation followed by the Tibetans is not compatible either with proximity to the territories of a great civilised power at whose hands the Tibetan Government enjoys the fullest opportunities both for intercourse and trade, or with due respect for the treaty stipulations into which the Chinese Government has entered on its behalf (IOR: V Cd.1920 [1904], 153; emphasis added)

The result of this new forward policy was the mission led by Francis Younghusband in 1903-4. In fact, this mission not only showed Tibetans their place in the imperial scheme of things but also em-placed Tibet in the modern geopolitical imaginary.

In his famous dispatch of 8 January 1903, Curzon mentions his two failed attempts (the third attempt was being made) to get in personal touch with the Dalai Lama; the failure of measures to "materially" improve British position on the border; persistent rumors about the Russo-Chinese deal; and his own conviction that "some sort of relations" existed between Russia and Tibet, changing the scenario:

We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction-a political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties. China is always ready to break down the barriers of ignorance and obstruction, to open Tibet to the civilizing influence of trade, but her pious wishes are defeated by the short-sighted stupidity of the Lamas. In the same way, Tibet is only too anxious to meet our advances, but she is prevented from doing so by the despotic veto of the suzerain. This solemn farce has been re-enacted with the frequency that seems never to deprive it of its attractions or its power to impose. (IOR: V Cd.1920 [1904], 154-55)

Many other British Indian officials agreed with Curzon's view of Chinese control as mere "tutelage" (Sandberg 1904, 13). Charles Cock's memorandum in 1903 pointed out that "China is a hopeless factor" that had "no real hold over Tibet, and was only made use of by the Tibetans as an excuse for not communicating directly" with the British (IOR: L/P &S/18/B144 1903, 41). But there were dissenting voices too. For instance, Curzon's position went against the observations made about de jure Chinese authority in a memorandum written by William Lee-Warner in 1902, arguing that the 1890 Convention "practically recognises Chinese sovereignty over Tibet," and after the rumors of a Russian protectorate over Tibet, "We have warned China, thus again recognising Chinese sovereignty" (IOR: L/P &S/18/B138 1902, 23).

Dissenting voices were ignored, the mission was sent, and as Tibetans continued to resist British demands for opening up negotiations, the mission forced its way to Lhasa. The Dalai Lama fled but the Tibetan government was forced to sign the Lhasa Convention, a treaty that was described by Candler as "the result of an impression, upon the least impressionable People in the world" (in IOR: MSS EUR/F197/108 n.d., 3). Even though Curzon rejected Chinese control as a fiction unhelpful to a modern civilized power such as British India, the Lhasa treaty signed at the end of the invasion did not indicate a defining of Tibet in terms of independence. [50] This is understandable, for the British government was by now clearly averse to "any policy in Tibet which would tend to throw on the British Empire an additional burden" (IOR: MSS EUR/F197/106, 46). In a speech delivered on the signing of the Lhasa Convention on 7 September 1904, Younghusband mentioned "Chinese suzerainty" even though it was not included in any written text:

The Convention has been signed… In the Convention the British Government have been careful to avoid interfering in the smallest degree with your religion. They have annexed no part of your country. They have made no attempt to interfere in your internal affairs. They fully recognise the continued suzerainty of the Chinese Government… You have found us bad enemies when you have not observed treaty obligations and shown disrespect to the British Representative. You will find us equally good friends if you keep the present treaty and show civility. (Ibid., 271)

Tibet was forcefully brought into the international arena. Campbell points out in a memorandum dated 5 April 1906 that the Amban representing the Qing imperial authority refused to sign the Anglo-Tibetan Convention in 1904 on the ground that it "robbed China of her suzerainty" and because the Chinese objected to the British "making any Convention with Tibet" (IOR: L/P &S/18/B157 1906, 178). In fact, Britain signed an Adhesion Agreement with China in 1906 as a follow-up to the Lhasa Convention.

This forced opening of Tibet had significant geopolitical impact as it led to an increased Chinese awareness of vulnerability at its "backdoor" (see Liming 1994; Tuttle 2005). Ironically, the Chinese central government sought to establish firm control over Tibet (first during the immediate aftermath of British invasion, and then from 1949 onward), ignoring its own history of a more loosely defined relationship with Tibet. In an official memorandum titled "Events in China, Korea and Siam, 1908," the change in Chinese stance is recognized unambiguously: "One clear result of her recent policy respecting the Dalai Lama is that China has officially proclaimed herself the Sovereign Power of Thibet, and can no longer evade the full responsibilities of its government" (in Nish 1995, 291). One can therefore see the Sino-Tibetan 1951 Seventeen Point Agreement and the events since then as completing what had been implemented initially in 1908 but was interrupted due to a civil war within China. The Dalai Lama's pleas for help from the British against new aggressive Chinese invasion were not accommodated, even though he appealed to the paternal aspect of British imperialism:

At such a time, when a big and powerful nation is trying to swallow up a smaller and weaker nation, we cannot help appealing to other powerful nations for aid and assistance, which the law of nations should make you feel bound to grant us, being impelled by regard for the duty imposed by the dignity, power and justice of your Mighty Empire. (IOR: L/P &S/10/150 2750 5-7 1908, 24)