Alarcon went accordingly to Panama, whence he brought back to Peru the prisoners who had been taken at that place by Hinojosa, and was accompanied on his return by the son of Gonzalo. When near Puerto Viejo on his voyage back, Alarcon ordered Saavedra and Lerma, two of his chief prisoners, to be hanged on account of some words they were said to have spoken against the insurgents. He was disposed to have put Rodrigo Mexia, another of these prisoners, to death at the same time; but the son of Gonzalo pleaded strongly to save his life, by representing how kindly he had been used by Mexia while in his custody. Vela Nunnez was conducted to Quito, where he was pardoned by Gonzalo, yet admonished to behave very carefully for the future, as the slightest suspicion would be fatal. Cepeda, one of the oydors of the royal audience, always continued to accompany Gonzalo, so that Ortiz de Zarate, the only judge who remained in Lima was unable to act in the absence of all the other judges. Indeed he was now less feared, ever since Gonzalo Pizarro had almost by force procured a marriage between one of the daughters of that judge and his brother Blas Soto21. Still however this judge retained every proper sentiment of loyalty to the king, although constrained by the exigency of the times to conceal his principles, and to seem in some measure reconciled to the usurper.

While these transactions were going on in the north of Peru, the lieutenant-general Carvajal continued his operations in the south against Centeno. As formerly related, he departed from Cuzeo with three hundred men, well provided with horses, musquets and other arms, marching by way of the Collao for the province of Paria, in which Centeno then was with about two hundred and fifty men, determined to await the arrival of the enemy and to run the chance of battle. When Carvajal was come within about two leagues of that place, Centeno retired a short space to the other side of the city, taking post on the side of a river in what appeared to him strong ground, and Carvajal took possession of the tambo of Paria, about a league from the camp of Centeno. Next day, Centeno sent fifteen well mounted musqueteers to bid defiance to Carvajal, and to challenge him to battle. On arriving within a stones throw of the tambo, they required a conference with Carvajal, to whom they delivered the following message: "That Centeno was ready to give battle in the cause of his majesty; but if Carvajal, who had grown old in the royal service, would return to his duty and abandon the service of the usurper, Centeno and all his followers would be happy to serve under his command." To this message Carvajal only returned abusive language, and the two parties mutually reproached each other as rebels and traitors. After some time spent in this manner, the fifteen royalists discharged their musquets and returned to Centeno, to whom they gave an account of the number and disposition of the enemy. This occurrence took place on Holy Friday in the year 1546.

Immediately after this defiance, Carvajal put his troops in motion to attack the royalists, but Centeno thought proper to retire to a more advantageous post, not deeming it prudent to run the risk of a pitched battle, and meaning rather to harass the enemy by means of skirmishes and night attacks. He was likewise in hopes that a good many of those who followed Carvajal might come over to his side as opportunity offered, as he understood many of them were much discontented with the harsh and brutal behaviour of the lieutenant-general, whom they served from fear and constraint, not from attachment. Besides, Centeno was unwilling to run the risk of battle, as Carvajal though inferior in cavalry to the royalist party was greatly superior in point of fire arms. In fact this resolution of retreating was much against the inclination of Centeno, who wished to have given battle to Carvajal; but as all the inhabitants of La Plata on his side opposed that measure, he was obliged to conform to their wishes, yet always determined to give battle on the first favourable opportunity. Centeno accordingly retreated fifteen leagues that day, and was followed by Carvajal with great diligence, insomuch that the hostile parties encamped at night very near each other, on which occasion Carvajal confided the guard of his camp to such of his followers as he could most surely depend upon. Towards midnight, Centeno detached eighty horsemen to assault the camp of the insurgents, which they did accordingly with much spirit, making several discharges of their fire arms, but without any favourable impression; as Carvajal drew up his troops in order of battle, and kept them all night in their ranks, strictly forbidding any one to quit their post on any pretence, lest some might desert over to the enemy. At break of day, Centeno decamped and resumed his march, and was followed by Carvajal with equal diligence always very near. In this second day of the retreat the two parties marched ten leagues, or near forty miles; and towards evening Camijal came up with one of the soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had lagged behind owing to extreme fatigue. Carvajal ordered him immediately to be hanged, swearing that he would treat every one of the enemy who fell into his hands in the same manner.

Centeno continued always to retreat, and Carvajal to pursue close in his rear, both parties using the utmost possible diligence, insomuch that they every day marched twelve or fifteen long leagues, almost always within sight of each other. After some days, Centeno made a countermarch upon Paria by taking a different road, and even directed his march, towards the Collao, always followed by Carvajal. At Hayohayo22 Carvajal came up with twelve soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had fallen behind, all of whom he ordered to be hanged. In consequence of these continued rapid marches, several of the soldiers of both sides used daily to lag behind from excessive fatigue, all of whom endeavoured to hide themselves as well as they could to avoid being made prisoners. Finding his force daily diminishing, Centeno complained loudly of his officers and followers for having prevented him from fighting; and as he found the whole country through which he now marched attached to the enemy, he determined to direct his march towards the coast intending to escape if possible by sea. For this purpose he took the direction of Arequipa, and sent off one of his officers named Ribadeneyra to endeavour to procure a ship somewhere on the coast, which he was to bring to Arequipa, that it might be in readiness to embark the whole remnant of the retreating party immediately on their arrival23. Ribadeneyra fell in with a ship on the coast which was ready to sail for Chili, of which he easily took possession, and found it well adapted for his purpose.

"In the course of this pursuit, it happened, one day that Centeno had to pass a deep dell or narrow valley between two mountains, as often happens in that country, the descent to which was about a league from the top to a stream of water in the bottom, yet the hills were so precipitous and close together that their tops hardly exceeded a musquet shot. As Carvajal was well acquainted with this pass, he was confident of catching his enemy at this place as in a trap; believing that while Centeno was descending to the bottom, he should be able to gain the top of the hill, whence he might greatly annoy Centeno and his men while clambering up the opposite hill. Centeno was however fully aware of his danger, and was accordingly very careful to provide against the mischief which he foresaw might occur. He therefore placed six of his best mounted cavalry in ambush near the top of the first mountain, with directions to assail the rear of Carvajal's troops after the van and main body were past, so as to make a diversion and oblige Carvajal to return to succour his people, by which he and his men would be enabled, to get beyond the pass in safety. The ambush accordingly remained concealed until Carvajal and the best part of his troops were gone past; after which they sallied forth, and fell with great resolution on the rear which was marching on in disorder, consisting of a mixed multitude of Indians, Negroes, and straggling Spaniards, with horses mules and other beasts of burden, all in confusion and disorder, among whom they did great execution. Although he heard the noise occasioned by this unexpected assault, Carvajal continued his march for some time, believing it only a false alarm. The six horsemen therefore continued their assault almost unopposed, carrying all before them, and doing incredible mischief. Among the rest they overthrew a loaded mule which carried several quintals of gun-powder, which they blew up with so violent a noise that Carvajal was convinced of the serious nature of the assault, and found it necessary to desist from the pursuit of Centeno, and to return for the protection of his rear. When the six horsemen belonging to Centeno observed the approach of the troops of Carvajal, they immediately fled by cross ways and bye paths, under the guidance of some friendly Indians, and rejoined Centeno six or seven days afterwards. By this successful stratagem Centeno was enabled to escape across the dangerous pass, and even gained considerably in the retreat, as Carvajal was obliged to remain on the top of the first mountain all the rest of that day and the following night. Carvajal was much displeased at being thus foiled by one so much less experienced than he in the art of war, and observed to his officers, that during forty years service in the wars of Italy, where he had seen many fine retreats, accomplished by the king of France, by Antonio de Leyva, Count Pedro de Navarro, Mark Antony Colona, and other famous captains, he had never seen one so excellently contrived as this by Centeno24."