Gonzalo treated the prisoners sent to him by Acosta with much kindness, supplying them with clothes and arms, and gave them their choice of any of the companies of his troops in which they might think proper to serve. From these men, he received exact information of all the late events which had occurred at Panama, of the succours which the president expected to receive from different parts of America, and of the force which accompanied Aldana on the present expedition. They informed him likewise that Aldana had set on shore Pedro de Ulloa, a Dominican friar, disguised in a secular habit, who had orders to distribute copies of the amnesty in every direction. In consequence of this information, he was sought for and soon found; and Gonzalo had him confined in a dungeon near the fish-ponds in his garden, which was infested with toads and vipers, where he remained till he recovered his liberty on the arrival of the fleet some time afterwards.

About this time, it was determined to dispatch the licentiate Carvajal with three hundred mounted musqueteers, together with the detachment under Juan d'Acosta, to scour the coast to the northwards, and to attack Diego de Mora who had withdrawn into the province of Caxamarca. When every thing was in readiness for this expedition, the lieutenant-general Carvajal went one morning early to Gonzalo, and represented to him, that it was by no means safe to entrust so important a command to the licentiate, as a person in whom they could not repose implicit confidence. That although he had hitherto attached himself to their party, it was obviously for the sole purpose of being revenged of the late viceroy; and, as that purpose was now accomplished, it did not appear that his fidelity could be depended upon. It was proper to recollect, he added, that all the brothers of the licentiate were greatly attached to his majesty, particularly the bishop of Lugo who enjoyed several high employments; so that it was not to be imagined the licentiate would act cordially in the interest of a party which was diametrically opposed to that in which all his nearest relations were engaged. Besides all which, this person had formerly been made a prisoner by themselves, without any just foundation, and had even been so nearly punished capitally, that he had been ordered to make his testament and to confess himself in preparation for death, which injurious treatment he could not be supposed to have forgotten. Gonzalo was so much convinced by these arguments, that he countermanded the order given to the licentiate Carvajal, and sent off Juan d'Acosta on the expedition to Caxamarca, with a force of two hundred and eighty men. D'Acosta accordingly set out on this intended service, taking the road for Truxillo; but on arriving at Baranza, about twenty four leagues from Lima, he halted at that place for reasons which will appear in the sequel.

At this period, the Captain Saavedra, who was lieutenant-governor of Guanuco for Gonzalo, received letters from Aldana urging him to quit the insurgent party and to declare for his majesty. He accordingly determined to do so; and under pretence of obeying the orders he had received from Gonzalo of joining his army at Lima, along with Hernando Alonzo, he assembled all the soldiers he could procure in that province, with whose assistance he fortified the city of Guanuco, and informed them of his resolution to exert his best endeavours in the service of the king. All his soldiers agreed to follow his example, except three or four who fled and informed Gonzalo of the defection of their governor. Saavedra retired immediately to Caxamarca, with forty horsemen, where he joined Diego de Mora and those who had withdrawn along with him from Truxillo, where both declared themselves for the royalist party. On learning the defection of Saavedra and the principal inhabitants of Guanuco, Gonzalo sent an officer to that place at the head of thirty soldiers; with orders to pillage and destroy the city: But the Indians of the neighbourhood, having armed themselves and taken possession of the place by the orders of their masters, made so resolute a defence that the insurgent detachment was beaten off, and constrained to return to Lima, being unable to procure any other plunder except some mares cattle and other animals belonging to the settlers.

On the arrival of Antonio de Robles at Cuzco, whom Gonzalo had sent to take the command in that city and province, Alfonso de Hinojosa, who had hitherto been lieutenant-governor there, resigned the command of the city and troops, but as was believed with much dissatisfaction. De Robles immediately collected as much money as he could procure, and enlisted all the soldiers that were to be found in that neighbourhood, with whom he marched to Xaquixaguana, about four leagues from Cuzco. At that place he learned that Diego Centeno; who had concealed himself for more than a year in a cave among the mountains, had recently left his concealment, on learning the arrival of the president, and had collected several of his former partisans, who had hidden themselves from the fury of Gonzalo in various parts of the woods and mountains. By this time Centeno had collected about forty men, mostly on foot, though some of them still had the horses with which they had made their escape. Although these men were neither so well armed or equipped as they could have wished, Centeno resolved to make an attempt upon Cuzco, shewing as much confidence as if he had been at the head of five hundred well armed troops. His principal followers were Luis de Ribera, Alfonso Perez de Esquival, Diego Alvarez, Francisco Negral, Pedro Ortiz de Zarate, and Friar Dominic Ruiz, commonly called Father Viscayno. With this small band of followers, Centeno drew nigh to Cuzco, being doubtless invited to that step by some of the principal inhabitants, for the purpose of freeing them from the tyranny of De Robles, a young man of low origin and little ability. It was even said that Alfonso de Hinojosa, from resentment against Gonzalo for superseding him in the government, had sent privately to offer his assistance to Centeno. Both of these reports are highly probable; as otherwise it would have been a most inexcusable rashness in Centeno, to call it no worse, to have presumed upon attacking Cuzco with the small number of men he had collected; as, besides the inhabitants of the city, there were more than five hundred soldiers there and in the environs, while he had only forty ill armed men, most of whom had swords or daggers fastened to poles, instead of pikes or lances.

On learning the approach of Centeno, De Robles returned to Cuzco, where he made such preparations as seemed necessary; and, on hearing that Centeno was within a days march, he took the field with three hundred men, sending forwards Francisco de Aguira to procure intelligence. This person was brother to one Peruchio de Aguira who had formerly been put to death by the lieutenant-general Carvajal, and was consequently a secret enemy to the insurgent party. Instead therefore of executing the commission confided to him by De Robles, he went immediately to join Centeno, whom he informed of every thing that was going on at Cuzco and of the state of affairs in that city. In the night before the festival of Corpus Christi of the year 1547, Centeno advanced toward the city of Cuzco, by a different road from that in which De Robles and his troops were posted; and, having turned one of his flanks, made an unexpected assault with great resolution, as resolved to conquer or die. Completely surprised and thrown into confusion, the troops of De Robles were unable to get into any order for defence, and even in several instances turned their arms against each other, insomuch that a good many of them were slain by their own comrades. On this occasion Centeno used the following stratagem, which succeeded admirably: Having taken off the saddles and bridles from the horses belonging to his small band of followers, he ordered them to be driven by his attendant Indians along the road which led to the front of the enemies camp, to call off their attention from his real attack on their flank and rear. By this means, as the horses were urged on by the Indians behind, they threw the troops of De Robles into confusion, and enabled Centeno to penetrate into the camp unperceived and unopposed, where he and his men exerted themselves so courageously that the insurgents were completely defeated and put to flight.