Next day, when all the army with its stores and followers had passed the river, Don Juan de Sandoval was sent out upon discovery, who reported on his return that he had advanced three leagues into the country without seeing any thing of the insurgents. Hinojosa and Valdivia were then ordered to advance with several companies of infantry to occupy the passes in the neighbouring mountain, as Gonzalo might have given them much trouble if he had taken possession of these heights, which were above a league and a half in ascent; and this order was happily executed without meeting with any resistance. When Acosta retreated from the river, in consequence of believing himself too weak to attack those who had passed, he sent to demand a reinforcement from Gonzalo of a hundred musqueteers, with the aid of whom he alleged he would be enabled to defeat the royalist party which had crossed. At this time one Juan Nunnez de Prado deserted from him to the president, and gave him notice of the succours which were expected by Acosta. Believing therefore that Gonzalo would advance with all his forces, the president took post on the ridge of the mountain with above nine hundred men, both cavalry and infantry, and remained under arms all night. Next morning, Acosta advanced with the reinforcement he had demanded, and the scouts of the president brought notice of his approach. On this intelligence, believing the whole army of the insurgents at hand, the president sent his major-general Alfonzo de Alvarado back to the river, to bring up the artillery and the rest of the army: And as the colours of Pizarro came in sight, before the return of Alvarado, the president drew up his nine hundred men in order of battle, giving all the necessary orders in case of being attacked. But in a short time, it was discovered that these precautions were unnecessary, as Acosta soon retreated with his three hundred men, on seeing the greatly superior force of the royalists.

The president remained two or three days in the position he had taken on the summit of the mountain, waiting for his artillery and the rest of his army. While at that place, Gonzalo sent him a message by a priest, demanding that he should dismiss his army, and refrain from making war against him till he should receive new orders from his majesty. On this occasion, the bishop of Cuzco, who was along with the president, ordered the priest into confinement. A little time before this, Gonzalo had dispatched another priest, to endeavour to gain over Hinojosa and Alvarado to his party, But that messenger, being resolved to desert the party of the insurgents, had taken measures in concert with his brother to go off in company with all their effects, in which they succeeded. At this time likewise the president wrote to Gonzalo, as he had repeatedly done during his march, earnestly entreating him to submit to the orders of his majesty, and sending him at the same time a copy of the amnesty. The usual manner in which these dispatches was forwarded to Gonzalo, was by means of the scouts of the army, who had orders to give them to those belonging to Gonzalo when they chanced to meet.

When it was known at Cuzco that the president had crossed the river Apurimac with all his army, and had taken possession of the pass in the high mountain, Gonzalo Pizarro immediately marched out from that city with his army and encamped at Xaquixaguana, about five leagues from Cuzco, in a plain through which the road passed by which the royalists would have to march on their way from the mountain towards Cuzco. His army at this time consisted of five hundred and fifty musqueteers, with six pieces of cannon, and three hundred and fifty cavalry and pikemen. Gonzalo established his camp in a very strong position, as it was only accessible in front by means of a very narrow defile, one flank being secured by a river and morass, the other flank by the mountain, and the rear by precipitous rocks. During two or three days, that the two armies remained near each other before the battle, Gonzalo sometimes detached a hundred and sometimes two hundred men to skirmish with similar parties of the enemy. As the royalist army was now encamped only at a short distance from the insurgents, Gonzalo was afraid his troops might lose courage by noticing the vast superiority of the enemy in number, and that many of his men might abandon him; for which reason he always drew up his men under cover of a rising ground near his camp, pretending that he did so to induce the president to attack him in his present advantageous post, confiding in his numbers and believing the insurgents much fewer than they really were.

After the president had passed the mountains and pitched his camp on the descent towards the plain, within view of the insurgents, Gonzalo drew up his army in order of battle, and caused some discharges to be made from his cannon and musquetry. On that day there arose so thick a mist, that the scouts and spies of the two armies often came against each other unexpectedly. Seeing that the insurgents were disposed to await his attack, or even to give battle, the president was inclined to defer bringing matters to that extremity for some time, in the hope that a considerable number of the enemy might come over to him if they could find an opportunity. Yet, as the season was exceedingly cold, even accompanied with strong frost, and as wood could not be procured for making fires, and provisions were scarce, it was impossible to remain long in a state of inaction. The army of Gonzalo was not subject to any of these inconveniencies, having plenty of provisions brought regularly from Cuzco, and being encamped in a comfortable and temperate situation in comparison with the position of the president, whose camp was on the slope of the mountain, while that of the insurgents was in the plain or valley below. Such is the difference in the temperature of Peru at very inconsiderable distances, that on the mountains a severe cold is experienced, accompanied by frost and snow, while only at eight or ten miles distance in the valley the inhabitants are obliged to use precautions to relieve them from excessive heat.

Gonzalo and his lieutenant-general, Carvajal, had formed an arrangement for a night attack upon the president, intending to have assailed his camp in three points at the same time; but they were induced to abandon this project, in consequence of the desertion of one of their soldiers named Nava, who communicated their intentions to the president. By this person and some others who had joined him from the army of Gonzalo, the president was advised to delay coming to battle as long as possible; as they were certain that many of the followers of Gonzalo would take the first favourable opportunity of returning to their duty, more especially those soldiers who had served under Centeno, and who had been constrained after his defeat to enter into the ranks of the insurgents to save their lives. In expectation of the proposed attack, the president kept his army the whole of that night under arms, by which they suffered, much distress from the extreme coldness of the weather on the mountain, so that many of the soldiers were hardly able to keep hold of their arms, and waited impatiently for day. At daylight, a party of musqueteers belonging to Gonzalo was observed in march to gain possession of a height in the neighbourhood of the royal camp. Mexia and Palomino were immediately detached, with three hundred musqueteers, to dislodge them, and Valdivia and Alvarado advanced in the same direction, so that the enemy were soon forced to retire. During this skirmish, the president marched down from the mountain with the main body of his army, in the direction of Cuzco, under cover of the hill on which the skirmish had taken place; and, to distract the attention of the enemy, a small detachment of cavalry and infantry was ordered to advance in view of the insurgent camp from that hill. On the arrival of Valdivia and Alvarado at the top of the hill, observing that it was possible to cannonade the camp of the enemy from that place, they sent orders to Gabriel de Royas to bring up the artillery. On this occasion, De Royas promised a reward of five hundred crowns for each ball that should reach the enemy: In fact he paid that sum about a year afterwards to one of his gunners, who sent a ball through the tent of Gonzalo, which was exceedingly conspicuous, by which one of his pages was slain. In consequence of this incident, Gonzalo ordered all the tents to be struck, that they might not serve as marks for the cannoneers of the president. He likewise ordered his own artillery to commence firing, and drew up his army in order of battle, taking his own station at the head of his cavalry, which was commanded by the licentiate Cepeda and Juan d'Acosta. Carvajal was at the head of the infantry, having under him the captains Juan de la Torre, Diego Guillen, Juan Velasquez de Guevara, Francisco Maldonado, and Sebastian de Vergara. Pedro de Soria commanded his artillery. When the insurgent army was drawn up in order of battle, the numerous Indians that were attached to it quitted the camp, and posted themselves in view of both armies on the slope of a neighbouring hill.