Сomment on the present situation, N10 (October 2002)

Calling things by their proper names

The most prominent event of October 2002 covered by mass media throughout the whole world seized strong attention of the “average” people who live only for the immediate needs and contemplate virtually nothing about the long-term political perspective. No doubt this event was the taking of hostages by the Chechen “rebels” at a musical performance called “Nord-Ost” (based on V.Kaverin’s story “Two captains”). It took place on October 23rd on the premises of the State ball-bearing factory’s former palace of culture, followed by their dramatic rescue on the night of October 25 ^th . The interpretation of how this event interconnects with the current politics in Russia and abroad, expressing the opinion of the USSR’s Internal Predictor and the “Uniting” party was published on October 29 at in the “Politics” section under an excessively pretentious header “Russian conceptualists conduct a sensational analysis of Moscow events”. Therefore this comment deals with only those aspects of this event which exceed the narrow boundaries of “current politics”, though they continually manifest themselves within these politics.

What they urge to do in their appeals

From the very start of this drama and throughout the consequent week the ‘liberal’ newsmen both in Russia and abroad have been whinging and appealing. They insisted that the Russian authorities should negotiate and come to an agreement with the Chechen side – with the separatists’ leaders, field commanders, armed gangs – whenever they display peaks of activity. And though it is not worded directly, such homilies actually imply that the Russian authorities should conform to all demands of Chechen separatists, and that after it is done the war for control over the Chechen territory would cease by itself; peace would restore in Russia, and some time later, after Russia would apologise to “freedom-loving” Ichkeria and reimburse for all the damage inflicted in the course of war, Russia and Ichkeria would become good neighbours.

Well, only a committed enemy of Russia or a complete imbecile can agree with such position. Also, only a convinced enemy of Russia or a complete imbecile could go urging of the government to implement a policy of this sort.

That is why it appears necessary to clarify the sources and reasons of current political events, and look into where they lead to.

In every type of society there are people who are dissatisfied with their social life. Those dissatisfied get together and form a multifaceted opposition to the ruling regime. At a certain stage the opposition proceeds from thoughts to words, from words to actions, and depending on its’ morals and the depth of their understanding, start effecting pressure upon the regime using available means. If their morals are bad and minds are feeble the opposition comes down to blackmailing the regime, one of the ways of which is terror against “just anyone from the crowd”, i.e. the “average” people. The majority of the “average” people live only in and for the present day, they wouldn’t and and cannot think about the consequences of the actions of each one of them and what effect their actions could bring to the state policies. That is why in the times of terror outbursts, guided by their own fears they are ready to start recirculating pressure upon the government and sabotage its policy[1]. Then – if the government turns ruthlessly on terrorism – they would support the government in its deterioration into a fascist dictatorship as the result of the ruthless if deliberate campaign of eliminating real and imaginary terrorists, their accomplices and sympathisers.

That is why if control over Chechnya were to be handed over to those who covet it now, then once they take it – provided that Chechen diaspora continues its’ existence throughout the rest of Russia - such principal policies of the Russian government targeted at serving those who covet control over Chechnya and their associates would inevitably cause the Chechen yoke to fall upon Russia. Yet this is impossible, as in Russia there are other separatists who would try, seeing that the central government loses influence, to bite off a part of power, which they alledge their share. This is what happened when the USSR broke apart, consequently driving most people’s lives for the worse, making them lose confidence in the nearest future. And there are also advocates of united and multinational Russia, who also are not sitting around twiddling their thumbs, waiting for a new “master” to hold up his bum for them to kiss it.

The option of Ichkeria’s separation into an independent state, secured by the control of the international forces (similar to what was done in Kosovo at the time of dividing Yugoslavia and Serbia) was also put forward in one of radio “Freedom”s broadcasts on October 29, 2002. But this option would also be a step forward along the global policy of disintegrating Russia, which would bring affliction and suffering to the peoples of Russia.

Another possible option of how the Russian government could deal with Chechnya is as follows: if during a police raid a “zindan” (a ground hole - prison for slaves) is detected near the household of a Chechen family, each and every member of this family must be shot right at the spot without the right to trial in court or legal investigation. One person should be shot out of every neighbouring house on the charges of failure to notify the authorities that their neighbours are engaged in slave-owning. If the “zindan” was used by all villagers collectively, then all the people of the village are to be executed, with the exception of children under 3 years of age and those families whose members had notified the authorities about the existence of the “zindan” in the village. Further, if a Chechen national resides in Russia and travels around without the Department of Internal Affairs (MVD) registration, he is put into a concentration camp to stay there until the situation in the country quiets down.

The scenario of Russia breaking apart would satisfy many of the politicians and “average” people in both CIS states and the West, while the option of enforcing civil order based on the principle “you got a zindan – everyone is executed immediately; you live in Russia without registration and migration reports to the MVD – you stay in a concentration camp until the situation quiets down” would meet hypocritical condemnation abroad. And though there are organisational and military means to implement this option it would be detrimental for the whole of Russia, and not only for Chechens both for those living in Chechnya and those residing in the rest of Russia.

So if the government acts in the interests of the peoples of Russia it has no right to give in to the negotiations with the leaders of the mafia striving for control over Chechnya and to the affected citizens acting on their bidding by complying with all their demands. It equally has no right to limit its Chechen policy to a ruthless punitive operation that leaves a chance of survival only to grovellers and rascals who stay in their hide-outs until unfolding History gives them another opportunity to start a “liberating” war. Yet for the policies to be effective, and stay clear of the both unacceptable options, the Russian government and the people of Russia will have to understand the essence of the Russian-Chechen relationship problem.

The essence of the Russian-Chechen relationship problem

First of all one should not think that Chechnya came to be a part of the Russian Empire solely as a consequence of the Tsarist policy of conquest. The Russian tsarism simply turned out to be more capable of conquering the Caucasus than Turkey, Iran or Great Britain. At the time prior to “subduing the highland peoples of the Caucasus” those peoples and the Russian society were on different stages of social development: