The personal blame for this sabotage, this biosphere environmental crime lies completely on Nikita Khrushchev, the members of the Central Committee of Communist Party, the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of those years, the State Planning Committee, the corresponding departments of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

This could have not happen if it had been done according to common sense, the fundamental economic law of socialism and the law of planned proportional development of national economy.

In this case the roads and accommodation would have been built first of all. The agricultural production would have been limited by the amount necessary to feed the new-coming population. In several years aeromechanics would have been modified to agree with natural conditions of the region. And then on this basis the problem of food self-sufficiency of the USSR would have been solved in the regular succession of generations and in constant care for the sustenance of the soils’ fertility[143].

One does not need to be a genius to work out in advance a plan for reclamation of virgin soils very much like this sequence of successive and mutually coordinated actions. It was necessary simply not to regard a plan as some sort of a record to beat, not to make much of abstract numbers in order to blow up a propaganda boom, but to concentrate on what in particular should be done, in what succession and by whom, what resources are necessary for it and what metrologically consistent indices give ground that one may proceed to the next stage of a complex plan.

Another expression of the “elite” policy of constraining population to the degraded parasitic range of needs are «khrushchevki» (standard blocks of flats built during the times of Khrushchev). Their «architecture» psychologically depresses an individual and their overcrowded conditions (or «compactness and «combined lay-out» of everything and all, if to use the slang of those times). Their small size and number of rooms destroyed the extended family. Thus the «khrushchevki» epoch caused an irretrievable damage to formation of individuals in several generations, because nothing can substitute an everyday communication of a small child with his grandparents[144].

If to dwell further on the problem of individual formation let us recollect a well-known phrase «architecture is music in stone». And in the same way as musical background (radio, audio-records) influences human psyche and activity, architectural background also has this kind of influence. In textbooks on ancient history, which everybody (in the USSR) studied by in the 1960 — 1970s, it was told how an enemy army burst into the Athens acropolis. When the warriors beheld the statue of Pallas Athena standing in front of them on the pedestal they were stunned and retreated without committing any plunder. This is an example of the influence of architecture which is if not ideal yet closer to an ideal than that of modern cities. And when we try to investigate the reasons of youth riots like the one in the center of Moscow on June 9, 2002 when Russia lost the football match to Japan it should be kept in mind that the majority of the participants of that hell-bender grew up against the «architectural» (if it can be called such) background of «khrushchevki» — «vivarium»[145].

One can often hear that «khrushchevki» caused rapid growth of housing construction, that people moved from communal flats and cellars, that the housing problem[146] in towns was being solved. But these are two different and hardly interconnected questions: the first is a question of architectural forms and styles and the second is a question of building materials, technologies and constructions. Nothing, except an anti-national neo-Trotskyite political course, prevented from applying more productive building technologies in combination with a life-asserting architectural style instead of the unnatural style of «khrushchevki» — «vivarium».

Besides, in order to raise the statistics on «housing construction» the doors in «khrushchevki» were installed not on the borders between a room and a corridor (or a kitchen and a corridor) according to the rectangular outline of rooms, but within a meter from this border towards the corridor. A passage to the kitchen through a niche in the dining room in some «khrushchevki» can be explained by the same desire to fake report statistics. This niche appeared as a result of eliminating the wall between the dining room and the corridor that led to the kitchen passing the bathroom. Because of such architectural perversions each room or a kitchen acquired up to two additional square meters, which could not be used but were included into reports on housing construction. These meters were also charged according to tariffs on usable are and were taken into account in case of an application for improvement of living conditions.

The same happened with the staircases. Lifting a piano to the fifth floor became an theme for jokes of that epoch. However the reality was that millions of elderly people could not descend those staircases and that the deceased had to be turned over in order to be carried down because the coffin could not fit into the narrow space of stair flights. It will take several generations to overcome the consequences of that period.

Besides, «khrushchevki» were tightly connected with the notorious «six hundred square meters»[147] land allotments, which were sometimes a hundred kilometers away from the town place of habitation (it deserves no other name). The result is:

«“Khrushchevki” + “six hundred square meters”» = «destroyed biocenoses + waste of land resources, transport and industrial capacities» in contrast to the option of building family cottages with attached plots of land in towns and developing production which does not engage many people in small towns and in the country-side.

The development of the USSR’s Armed Forces in the post-Stalin period was also an act of sabotage. For the military forces in peaceful time to warrant the country’s ability to defend and to develop successfully the number of soldiers or seamen should correspond to the number of officers and the quantity of high-quality equipment in accordance with the specific branch of arms and the military doctrine. In order to maintain all of this in fighting efficiency an infrastructure of bases (accommodation for soldiers, officers and their families, shooting-ranges, etc) and training facilities should be developed. Because some armaments become morally and physically obsolete and are taken off the register national economy should develop a complex of modernization, reconstruction and utilization industries[148].

Violation of structural proportions of the military forces towards increasing the quantity of armaments and manpower proper which are not backed up by due development of infrastructures of basing, training, reconstruction, modernization and utilization is justified in one and only case: if the war is known to start in the nearest future. In this war the quantity of armaments and manpower excessive in comparison to the proportions of peacetime will secure a quick victory resulting from a massive strike on the offence or on the defense. Or it will be destroyed during the first stage of a stabilized warfare.

But if the military forces of a state are growing during more than 30 years (1953 — 1985) according to proportions of a wartime period — it is an issue of a separate research.

In our opinion during the period between the summer of 1953 when Nikita Khrushchev came to power and the death of Leonid Brezhnev in 1982 all the information on real processes of global policy given to the leaders of the USSR was intentionally perverted by consultants in science (The Institute on the USA and Canada) and intelligence, which happened due to the all-around influence of second-generation Trotskyites. Drinking (both Khrushchev and Brezhnev) and smoking (Brezhnev) were with few exceptions an integral part of the party and state leaders’ life-style. They perverted and depressed the psychological state of politicians and prepared a «fertile field» for them to be suggested all kinds of false ideas about the intentions and actual policy of the USA, NATO and the processes of global policy in general.