All this was said in a tough and at times more than tough, almost fierce way. Probably in some points his speech included elements of game and account, but still one could feel true alarm[330] not without tragic hidden motive. It was in connection with danger of concessions, fear and capitulation, that Stalin appealed to Lenin in the phrases, which I have already quoted in my record of that time <the one of 1953, with which we began citing K. Simonov’s memoirs>. Now, in fact, the speech concerned Stalin himself, who could leave, and those who could stay after his departure. But he wasn’t talking about himself; instead he was talking about Lenin and his intrepidity in the face of any conditions.

The main peculiarity of Stalin’s speech was that he didn’t consider it necessary to talk about courage or fear, resolution or defeatism. Everything he said about it he connected with two certain members of the Politburo, who were sitting in the same hall two meters behind him. As for me, I never expected to hear about these two people something Stalin was talking about them.

First he assailed Molotov with all these accusations and suspicions, accusations of unfaithfulness, suspicions of cowardice, defeatism. It was so unexpected, that fist I just couldn’t believe my ears, I thought I had misheard or misunderstood. But it proved to be just so. From Stalin’s speech it was evident that the most suspicious man who was capable of defeatism, and the most dangerous one for Stalin that evening, that plenary session was nobody else, but Molotov. He was talking about Molotov grimly for a long time. He gave some examples (which I don’t remember) of Molotov’s erroneous actions[331] mainly connected with the time when Stalin had been on leave, and Molotov had deputized for him solving some problems incorrectly, which he had had to solve in another way. I don’t remember what the problems were, probably partly for the reason that Stalin spoke to the audience, which was conversant with the political cobweb connected with the problems better than me. I didn’t always understand what he was talking about. Another reason for it could be the fact that his accusations were somehow reserved, vague and dim, at least I perceived it in that way.

I never understood what was Molotov’s fault. I just understood that Stalin accused him of a number of actions he had done in the after-war period. Stalin accused him in such a towering temper, which seemed to be connected with a direct danger for Molotov, with a direct threat to make final conclusions, which could be quite expected from Stalin, as the past proved. In fact, the main part of his speech, all the accusations of cowardice and defeatism, and the appeal to Lenin’s courage and rigidity Stalin connected with Molotov’s figure: he accused him of all the sins, which could not take place in the party, if the time had its effect and Stalin would no more be the leader of the party[332].

For all Stalin’s rage, which sometimes smacked of incontinence, in what he said there was the iron structure peculiar to him. The same structure was also present in the next part of his speech dedicated to Mikoyan, which was shorter, but more angry and disrespectful[333].

It was dreadfully silent in the hall. I didn’t look back at my neighbors. But I saw all the four Politburo members sitting behind Stalin, who stood at the rostrum and spoke. I saw all of them having hardened, strained, motionless faces. They as well as we didn’t know where and when Stalin would stop, whether after Molotov and Mikoyan he would pass on somebody else. They didn’t know what they were to hear about others or probably about themselves. Molotov’s and Mikoyan’s faces were white and lifeless. Their faces still were white and lifeless when Stalin finished, came back and sat at the table, and they — first Molotov and then Mikoyan — one after the other descended to the rostrum. There — Molotov for a longer time, and Mikoyan for a shorter one — they tried to explain their actions and conduct to Stalin, justify themselves, tell him that they had been neither cowards nor defeatists and wouldn’t fear new collisions with the capitalist camp and wouldn’t capitulate[334].

After the cruelty and rage, which sounded in Stalin’s speech when he spoke about them, both the speakers seemed to be defendants taking the final plea and pleading no guilty in all the points, but could hardly hope for a change in their fate, which had been determined by Stalin. I had a strange feeling, which I remembered then: they were speaking and it seemed to me that they were not the people whom I had seen so often not very far from me, but white masks put on their faces and which looked very much alike with the faces, and at the same time they were somehow absolutely different, lifeless[335]. I don’t know whether I’ve expressed myself precisely enough, but I had this very feeling, and I don’t exaggerate it antedate.

I don’t know why Stalin in his final speech at the Central Committee plenary session chose Molotov and Mikoyan as the two main objects for distrust. It was doubtless that he obviously wanted to compromise both of them, humble them, bereave ones of the most important historic figures after him of aureole. He wanted to make them small; especially he wanted to humble Molotov, to bring to nothing the aureole Molotov had[336], in spite of the fact that in the recent years he had been removed from the work to a great extent, in spite of the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was already run by Vyshinsky, in spite of the fact that his wife was in prison[337], — in spite of all this many-many people said or remembered Molotov’s name right after Stalin’s one. This was probably what Stalin didn’t want. This he tried to bring home to everyone who had gathered at the plenary session, to all the old and young Central Committee members and candidates, to all the old and new members of the Central Committee executive office, which was to be elected yet. But for some reason he didn’t want Molotov to stay after him the first figure in the state and the party. And his speech excluded such an opportunity.

(…)

And there’s one more thing. I don’t remember exactly whether in this speech before giving the floor to Molotov and Mikoyan, or after it, in another his speech, which preceded the elections of the Central Committee executive office — I’m even afraid to affirm that the second speech took place, probably everything was said in different parts of the first one, — standing at the rostrum and looking into the hall Stalin began talking about his old age and that he was unable to fulfill all the duties he is entrusted with. He could act as the chairman of Council of Ministers; he could also hold Politburo sessions as he had used to; but he was unable to hold Central Committee sessions as the Secretary General. That’s why he asked to exempt him from the latter post, comply with his request. I reproduce it almost in the way it was said. But this is not the matter of the words he said. Saying them Stalin was looking into the hall, and behind him the Politburo was sitting, and Malenkov, who hold the session while Stalin was speaking, was standing at the table. And I saw a horrible expression at Malenkov’s face — that was not fright, but such an expression that showed that the man had realized the mortal danger, which threatened everyone, and which the others hadn’t realized yet: one mustn’t agree with comrade Stalin’s request, one mustn’t let him resign from the last of his three commissions. Malenkov’s face, his gestures, his significantly raised hands were an outspoken entreaty to all the present to refuse Stalin’s request immediately and decidedly[338]. And then the words: «No, please, stay!» (or something like that), which sounded behind Stalin, were drowned by the buzz in the hall: «No! No! Please, stay! We beg you to withdraw your request!» I don’t presume to cite all the words and cries, but on the whole the people understood something, and probably, most of them had understood it before I did. In the first moment[339] all this seemed quite natural to me: Stalin would be the politburo chairman and the chairman of the council of Ministers, and somebody else would act as the Central Committee Secretary General, the way it had been under Lenin[340]. But what I didn’t understand at once, many others understood immediately or almost immediately, and Malenkov, who was responsible more than others as he was presiding at that moment, realized right away that Stalin wasn’t going to resign the post of the Secretary General, that it was a test, reconnaissance of the attitude to the problem posed by him — whether they, the sitting behind him in the presidium and in front of him in the hall, were ready to let him, Stalin, resign the post of the Secretary General because he was old, tired and wasn’t able to fulfill this third duty of his.