The keys to the battle were two ridges and it is the more important one, whose name, Alam Haifa, records this battle in British military history. Along the central part of the front was Ruweisat ridge and this dominated the whole of the middle sector. Alam Haifa was about 10 miles to the east of Ruweisat and observation from its summit allowed its occupants to control the course , of the fighting. The six Axis divisions struck at the British forces holding the southern end of the line whose farthest extremity was marked by the Himeimat ridge, a small pimple of ground but one of local tactical importance. Throughout the night of 30 August German mine-clearing teams had gapped the fields and by first light there was a space through which the armour and the infantry might pass. The tanks of the 8th Army, with the Rifle Brigade in support, flung back the first assaults but the army commander's orders were that the British Army was not to allow itself to be pinned down but was to give ground, leading the enemy on to where the armoured might of 8th Army waited on a ground of its own choosing. The pace of the Axis advance slowed against the British holding assaults but the thrust was carried to within 20 miles of Alamein. The Italian XX Corps was still stuck in the mine-fields and could give no help to the German spearhead, while on the central sector 90th Light had struck and forced back the 5th Indian Division's garrison on the Ruweisat ridge. As the armoured wedge of 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions drove northwards the tanks of 4th Armoured and 7th Motor Brigades struck at the flanks from the east while from the west came the flank assaults of 7th Armoured Division. Directly south of Alam Haifa ridge Montgomery had positioned 22nd Armoured Brigade and to support this unit there was the 10th Armoured Division. The .British intention was that every step of the German advance would be contested and to help delay the panzer thrust the Royal Air Force bombed the columns by night and by day.
The fierce fighting knew no break and, indeed, grew in intensity. Generals striving to carry out Rommel's intentions died at the head of their men as they brought them forward for one more charge: Bismarck of 21st Panzer fell and Nehring, commanding Africa Corps, was wounded. Losing men and tanks but slowly gaining ground the Germans beat their way forward and in the moonlit night of 31 August the point units, having reached the 40-kilometre point east of the start line, were ordered to swing out in a wide scything movement. As the panzers were refuelled the Littorio and other Italian divisions came up slowly on to the left flank and 90th Light Division dug in to consolidate the ground which it had won. But the fuel situation was once again desperate for the ships promised by Commando Supremo had been sunk en route. There was no immediate prospect of another ship, the Luftwaffe could not air-transport the amounts of fuel required, and the supplies still available could not reach the battlefield in time. For the last time Rommel regrouped his depleted and exhausted troops in one, final desperate panzer assault but it died and with it died the German hopes in Africa.
The last panzer assault upon the Alam Haifa ridge had failed and now nothing remained but to withdraw the troops back behind the mine-fields and there to establish some sort of bridgehead. In the afternoon of 3 September British reconnaissance patrols reported that three large Axis columns were moving westwards. The New Zealanders, who had borne the brunt of the panzer drive moved forward to cut the mine-field gaps through which the Axis armour would have to pass and thus cut the Africa Corps off. Fierce fighting marked this final stage of the battle but the Germans held the corridors open long enough and completed the withdrawal by 5 September.
Now with the knowledge that each succeeding day would see the British growing stronger, and certain of the fact that the promised supplies would never arrive, Rommel organised his positions to defeat the British thrust when it came, for if Alamein was a good defensive position for the 8th Army then it was a sufficiently good position for him. It was now his task to hold out for as long as possible for there was only the road back.
The medical officer of 21st Panzer Division, writing his report on conditions in the field, remarked that cases of lice infection were being found among the troops and that rodents were making their appearance behind the lines, A later report noted an increase in dysentry cases and, as a result of the men sleeping in the open without cover or rest, there was an increase in other illnesses and diet deficiencies were responsible for the great increase in hepatitis. In order to conserve his thinning ranks Rommel ordered that the strictest camouflage measures be undertaken to hide his precious panzers from air attack. The commander-in-chief threatened to fly over divisional positions to check that his orders were being carried out and this warning was sufficient.
This enforced rest was the first break from battle that the German troops had had since Gazala four months before and not only was the opportunity taken to carry out maintenance on the vehicles and to care for the artillery but refresher courses were run and the army settled down. They would not have been soldiers if they had not grumbled and their complaints were very much those of front line soldiers everywhere. The German troops in Africa felt that they were being neglected by the artistes of the front-line theatres in favour of rear echelon units and the Luftwaffe, who had more comfortable quarters and better food. It was a well-known secret that Luftwaffe planes flew between Africa and Europe bringing back fresh vegetables and delicacies unobtainable in the southern Mediterranean.
In order to pass the time more pleasantly, regimental officers tried to obtain sports gear but found that this would have to be indented for from Italy. Entertainments at regimental level and from regimental sources were organised and the group of comedians from 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment were very popular. Army reported that there were 12 speakers available who could talk amusingly on many subjects and issued 1200 sets of games among the troops. The 21st Panzer received musical encouragement in the shape of 8 piano accordians and among the visits received by division were the bands of 5th Panzer Regiment and 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Copies of the soldiers' newspapers printed in the Mediterranean theatre of operations — Die Oase, Adler von Hellas, and Kolonie und Heimat -were distributed as well as guides to historic Africa and various books written by divisional officers.
During this period there were certain ceremonies for which there had been no time while on active service. The 5th Panzer Regiment received a certificate for its 500th “kill”, the Panzer Artillery Regiment No 155 for its 80,000th round fired, and the divisional bakery company for its four millionth loaf baked.
Naturally there had been planning at high level and alternatives were drawn up to the main defence plan in the event of a British breakthrough at the south or the north. The growing realisation that Italian troops were now completely unreliable produced the scheme under which the Axis forces were intermingled so that each major Italian formation had a stiffener of German troops either with or near it. For all the fact that they were an unreliable element the amount of shipping space taken by the Italians was out of all proportion for no less than 77,000 men of that army's total strength of 146,000 was engaged in security or in administrative duties and the allocation of space in the convoys was computed upon Italian requirements and not upon the demands of the front line. Thus the ridiculous situation arose in which Italian rear units were up to establishment in trucks while German lorries for fighting units were waiting for space on docks in Italian harbours. Not once during the first seven months of 1942 did the amount of supplies received by the Africa Corps come up to the indent figures and less than 50 per cent of the minimum requirements of 30,000 tons of fuel was received. By adopting the most draconian measures, including cutting the bread ration, the Africa Corps was able to find shipping space to bring in the battle equipment it so desperately needed. One indent for 2400 tons of fuel produced a supply — 100 tons. But not all these shortages were attributable to Italian selfishness. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, had combined to strangle the armies in Africa by cutting off supplies and had had such success in sinkings that the total number of ships available to the Axis forces was 4 fast and 7 slow steamers. Even the fast ships could only make one journey each month and the slow ships had to wait for a convoy.