During the morning of 26th a virile thrust by the American tank battalion brought a new crisis for Nehring for during their advance 'C' Company of the United States tank battalion caught the aerodrome at Djedeida unguarded and in a short fierce fire-fight destroyed 17 of the aircraft drawn up there. The news that the Allied armoured spearheads were only 10 miles from the capital alarmed Nehring. He had viewed with concern over the period of the past few weeks the struggle of his men to hold back the furious assaults of the Allies and this new alarm confirmed in his mind the intention he already had; he would withdraw the perimeter line back towards Tunis and Bizerta. By shortening the line thus, he could perhaps have a chance to regroup his forces, to form a more solid line and maybe even build a proper reserve. All along the line of the German bridgeheads the orders to disengage went out and small, silent groups of men left the positions which they had fought for and defended with such tenacity and moved eastwards back towards the principal cities.
The German defensive line, if it can be called that, extended at that time from a point north of Djebel Abiod to the area of Mateur, along the Mateur-Djedeida road to St Cyprien and from thence to a point south of Hamman Lif. To the south of the perimeter there were detachments either guarding or extensively patrolling along the open southern flank.
It was imperative that the United States tank thrust around Djedeida be halted and the Luftwaffe was called upon to support the ground forces by air attacks upon the Allied spearhead. Nine separate attacks went in, and destroyed some vehicles but the others continued their advance. It seemed as if Allied boldness might yet win the race for Tunis, but as the American armoured fighting vehicles thundered along the western road they came into the defence sector which had been specially created to guard the approaches to the city. The backbone of this was the two 8.8cm guns which Nehring had himself sited.
The Luftwaffe gun crews held their fire as the American column came closer and still closer. At almost point blank range the gunners opened fire and the crack of the first shot was barely heard in a greater detonation as the lead tank blew up, then a second burst into flames, a third slewed round with its track destroyed, another and then another; the gunners firing as fast as they could load until six machines had been put out of action. In the face of such a weapon as the 8.8 with its high rate of fire and its great powers of penetration, the American tank unit could make no further advance. The American column turned and withdrew upon Djedeida.
During the early morning of 26th, Witzig's Group, which had received reinforcements of No 3 Company of the Tunis Field Battalion and a squadron of tanks from 190th Panzer Battalion, resumed its march upon Tebourba. To carry out this advance it had to cross ground in which American tank columns were ranging. Then followed the first battle between German and American armoured forces.
The German Panzer IVs were fitted with the long 7.5cm high velocity gun and the Panzer IIIs with the 5cm weapon. The United States tanks had smaller cannon but their force was not only numerically stronger but was in better tactical position. The Panzer IVs advanced in a shallow wedge formation with the lighter armed Panzer Ills in the intervals. Firing rapidly the panzer squadron advanced towards a company of American self-propelled guns but it had fallen into a trap and was taken in flank and from the rear by US tank groups hidden in hull-down positions. The United States tank crews fired at close range and to such good effect that all the Panzer IVs and several of the Panzer IIIs were knocked out within minutes. The remnants of the armoured elements of Witzig's command pulled back to the farmhouse which his para-engineers had defended so tenaciously.
Now that Medjez el Bab was in British hands Tebourba had become the next most important stepping stone in the advance by 11th Brigade and it fell to 1st Battalion the East Surrey Regiment at dawn on 27 November. The concentration of Blade Force armour in and around Tebourba and the Chouigui pass, some 4 miles north of the village, convinced Nehring that this was the area and the direction from which the decisive Allied assault would be made. The possession of Tebourba would determine whether Tunis would fall or would be held. Nehring sent in a series of armoured probing attacks to ascertain the Allied strength in the area. Two columns of infantry and tanks attacked; one from the north-east and the second from the east. Small, bitter battles were fought in the olive groves which are laid out all around the town.
Early in the morning of 27 November the East Surreys in the perimeter around Tebourba were attacked by a German tank column, Battle Group Lu'der. Leading the assault were two of the giant Panzer VI Tigers, which had been rushed over to Tunisia. A dozen or so other tanks completed the armoured group. The first wave of panzers rolled over the forward British infantry positions but then came under fire from a battery of British 25-pounder guns positioned behind the East Surreys. The tank gun versus field gun duel was short and predictable: all 8 guns of the British battery were knocked out and lay smashed and silent. But dotting the rolling countryside were 10 tanks of Battle Group Lüder, completely destroyed. At last light the German panzer column drew off down the road to Djedeida taking a further four damaged vehicles with it.
During the night of 27/28 November both sides improved their tactical positions or regrouped their forces. The British commander intended to capture Djedeida and then to move 11th Brigade in a north-westerly direction to cover the flank of the Allied force which would then thrust for Tunis. The elaborate plan for 36th Brigade to attack Djebel Abiod was not required for Witzig and his men had slipped away in the night and had moved back upon Bizerta. They had dug positions in the area of Jefna on the road to Mateur and stood there waiting.
On the morning of 28 November the 36th Brigade column led by the carrier platoon of 8th Battalion the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders advanced into the valley between the Djebel el Azag, known to the British as Green Hill, and the Djebel el Ajred, known as Bald Hill. Hidden in position on the slopes above the valley lay the men of Witzig's para-engineers and a pair of Italian SP guns. The German fire discipline was excellent and no shot was fired as the rifle companies of the Argylls moved into the valley. The Scots opened fire at 13.45hrs with machine guns and mortars upon suspected German positions but still no fire was returned. Emboldened by this lack of opposition the Argylls moved into the valley and Witzig gave the command to his men to open fire. A single shot from an anti-aircraft gun opened what became a hurricane of fire upon the Scots. The Italian SPs' first round smashed the last carrier on the track and the ground on either side of the track was mined. There could be no advance in the face of the fire which was being poured down upon the British nor could they withdraw. Within minutes eight carriers were smashed and blazing as they were picked off one after the other. Nor did the screen of riflemen forming the Argyll's advanced guard escape the fury of the German fire wfiich smashed into the killing ground, and only six men of the leading company reached the British lines. Further assaults or succeeding days by 6th Royal West Kents and No 6 Commando were alsc beaten back with heavy loss to the attackers. Exhausted by their fruitless efforts the men of 36th Brigade could make no further effort and fighting diec down on this sector,
German contrattack
To divert Nehring's attention from the main thrust, to compel him to split his force and thus to ease the British assault, General Evelegh ordered a para drop by 2nd Battalion upon Depienne on the southern flank of the advance. The British drop would capture the Luftwaffe's advanced air base at Oudns after which it was to join up with Blade Force. Meanwhile 1st Commando on the sea flank would make an assault landing near Sidi el Moudjad, behind the back of the German force which was opposing the advance of 36th Brigade.