Now they were dividing duties. Pacheco was focused on Cloud’s likeness. After receiving a high-resolution sketch from the CIA based on Malnikov’s description of Cloud, Pacheco had quickly pushed the sketch out to Interpol and other intelligence agencies. That effort was intended to find Cloud by tapping into any personal or professional knowledge or experience with him. In addition, Pacheco had digitized the sketch and run it against a number of NSA surveillance programs. One such program, PRISM, was running the photo against visual media channels across the globe. This included security cameras at both public and private institutions, like airports and train stations, as well as license scanners, and, in cities where they existed, such as London, police cameras on street corners. PRISM could scan social media networks, like Facebook and Instagram. It also included certain Web-based photo storage repositories, such as iCloud, Dropbox, Flickr, Google Drive, and dozens of others, large and small.

If an image appeared that resembled Cloud, either in real time or at some point in the past, the software would trigger an alert. By 1 A.M., four separate alerts had popped. Three were errors, but one was Cloud, an Instagram photo taken by a girl at Alexei Malnikov’s nightclub. In the photo, Cloud is in the background, in a tank top, gaunt and pale. His hair is what stood out, an alarming Afro of blond curls.

In turn, PRISM shared the photo, its origin, and any other data tied to it with the other NSA surveillance platforms, expanding their arc of detection.

June was focused exclusively on the one concrete piece of data they had: digital records of the hacker’s phone calls with Malnikov. There had been three in all. Because Malnikov was already on an NSA watch list, those phone calls had all been recorded. June did not even bother listening to the conversations. He wanted the phone numbers, which he quickly found and then matched to the companies that had provided cellular coverage for the specific calls.

Two of the numbers were attached to a company called Beeline. The third number belonged to a company called MegaFon.

Legally, June wasn’t supposed to be looking into the proprietary data of phone companies without permission from those companies. Certain companies allowed it for national security reasons, but neither Beeline or MegaFon was on that list. June, however, didn’t give a damn. When a nuclear bomb is headed toward American shores, the legalities were irrelevant.

Beeline was owned by a company based in Amsterdam and incorporated in Bermuda. June was able to quickly penetrate the company’s Bermuda offices, hacking into a server from which all corporate documents, submitted to taxation authorities, had been sent. Inside this server, June focused on billing records. It was a voluminous cache of data showing minute-by-minute transactions of all 220 million customers worldwide, going back several years.

When June ran the two prepaid numbers against the database, each came back with only one record: Alexei Malnikov. Cloud had called him, then presumably thrown the cards away. Both cards had been shut off the day of the calls.

June waged a similar intrusion into MegaFon’s records, this time going in through a “trapdoor” he’d built several years before. A hack that should’ve taken days, even weeks, now took less than an hour.

As with the prepaid phones, only one number had ever been dialed with the MegaFon Samsung cell: Alexei Malnikov. June expected as much. What he did not expect was for the Samsung phone to be live. He expected the phone to have been shut down. When he entered the number into MegaFon’s billing platform, he suddenly sat up and leaned in toward his computer screen.

“Call Jim,” said June, typing quickly.

“What is it?”

“His cell phone is still on,” said June.

When Bruckheimer entered the office, he moved behind June as, from beside him, Pacheco watched.

A map of Moscow appeared on the screen. A few keystrokes later, brightly lit gridlines appeared crisscrossed on top of the map. The feed sharpened and closed in, stopping on a street corner.

Bruckheimer leaned over next to June and hit the speakerphone.

“Get me Polk.”

15

NATIONAL CLANDESTINE SERVICE (NCS)

MISSION THEATER TARGA

LANGLEY

Two floors belowground, past multiple security checkpoints, in a dimly lit, windowless room walled in by high-def plasma screens, Calibrisi, Polk, and a half dozen others were gathered.

There were four mission theaters at CIA headquarters: Bravo, Echelon, Firehouse, and Targa. These were the epicenters of CIA covert operations around the world.

During a CIA operation, the mission theater served as tactical command control authority. Unless the senior case officer declared “in-theater command control,” someone at Langley was calling the shots. Using real-time visual and audio media, the theaters served to connect the many disparate, shifting elements of an operation in real time through the use of technology, data, and human intelligence. By managing an operation from a central hub, the Agency could direct the operators who were out there, at the front edge, risking their lives, with information such as the arrival of hostile forces or the detection of an operator’s movement.

The four CIA mission theaters occupied an entire floor two stories below ground level. Echelon was the largest, but Polk liked the intimacy of Targa. He wanted to be able to glance into the eyes of the dozen or so case officers, field experts, tactical support specialists, and analysts on his team.

A double chime sounded on the speaker, then Jim Bruckheimer came on.

“We have something and it’s live.”

“What is it?” said Polk.

“The phone he called Malnikov with is still on. I’m sending you the coordinates. He’s in Moscow.”

Polk moved behind one of his analysts, seated at the computer in front of a large black screen.

“Give me Moscow grid with all Langley assets,” said Polk.

The large plasma screen lit up. A live satellite image of Moscow came into sharp relief. A few seconds later, green lights began appearing on the screen, showing all CIA personnel available for deployment in or around Moscow. There were two CIA assets in the city.

“Put the coordinates of the target up,” said Polk.

In the lower left-hand side of the screen, a bright orange light, then the words “15 Prospekt Vernadskogo.”

“He’s near Moscow Polytechnic,” said the analyst.

Polk pointed to one of the green lights—a CIA agent who was close by.

“Highlight it,” said Polk.

The analyst hovered a cursor above the light and double-clicked it. A photo appeared of a young male with black hair and a mustache. Beneath the photo, an empty box appeared, asking for a password. The analyst turned to Polk.

“Sir?”

Polk glanced around the room, making sure every person present had requisite security clearance.

“553 dash TS dash 7,” he said.

When the analyst typed it in and hit Enter, the man’s biography spread in block letters beneath:

NOC:

344K-6T ALPHA

LTK:

4 OCT 2011

PDS:

MAYBANK, JOHN BRAEBURN, Lt.

DOB:

04/14/88, Charleston, SC

REW:

U.S. Navy SEAL Team 10 (SO1)

RANK:

4 V.E.X.

Polk pulled a small device from his chest pocket. It was an earbud, approximately the size of a gumdrop. He stuck it in his ear.