In the midst of the Cyprus campaign, Richard received an embassy from Guy of Lusignan. The Lionheart, as count of Poitou, was the feudal overlord of the Lusignan dynasty and Guy now sought to capitalise upon this bond, begging Richard to lend him support in the power struggle with Conrad of Montferrat. News also began to arrive from Palestine, intimating that Philip Augustus was making real progress at Acre. According to one crusader, ‘when the [Angevin] king heard this, he gave a great and heartfelt sigh, [and said,] “God forbid that Acre should be won in my absence.”’ Stirred to action, the Lionheart left Cyprus on 5 June 1191 and, upon making landfall in Syria, had Isaac Comnenus interned in the Hospitaller castle of Marqab. Richard headed south, but was refused entry at Tyre by Conrad of Montferrat’s garrison and so sailed on to reach Acre on 8 June.46
THE IMPACT OF THE KINGS
Richard the Lionheart’s arrival, alongside that of Philip Augustus, transformed the Latins’ prospects. The advent of these two monarchs revitalised the crusade, bringing new vigour and determination to the investment of Acre, supplying an empowering injection of resources–financial, human and material–that promised to bring this fiercely contested siege to a victorious end.
The arrival of Philip Augustus
In one sense, the rumours that Richard heard on Cyprus were right: King Philip had made significant progress at Acre since his arrival on 20 April 1191. While noting that he reached the city with a modest fleet of just six ships, Baha al-Din conceded that the French monarch was ‘a great man and respected leader, one of their great kings to whom all present in the army would be obedient’. He came with much of the remaining might of the French nobility; men like the veteran crusader Count Philip of Flanders (who survived only to 1 June) and the proud and powerful Count Hugh of Burgundy. Although contemporary writers partisan to the Lionheart tended to downplay the French king’s achievements at Acre, in reality Philip immediately made his presence felt, working to intensify the military pressure on Acre’s garrison while consolidating the Frankish position.
Having ‘ordered his crossbowmen and archers to shoot continuously so that no one could show a finger above the walls of the city’, the king oversaw the erection of seven massive stone-throwing machines and the strengthening of the palisade surrounding the crusaders’ trenches. On 30 May, with his catapults ready for action, Philip initiated a determined bombardment campaign of such intensity that ‘stones rained on [Acre] night and day’, forcing Saladin to move his troops back to the front line. Reaching Tell al-Ayyadiya by 5 June, the sultan launched daily attacks on the Latin trenches, hoping to interrupt their aerial offensive, but nothing seems to have stilled the French siege engines. At the same time, the crusaders were preparing for a frontal ground assault, making renewed attempts to fill sections of Acre’s dry moat so that they could gain access to the walls. With the Franks throwing dead horses and even human remains into the ditch, the Muslim garrison was left with the desperate task of trying to empty the channel faster than the Latins could fill it. One Muslim witness described how the defenders were split into three groups: one ‘going down to the moat and cutting up corpses and horses to make them easy to carry’, another transporting this grisly burden to the sea and a third defending against Christian attack. It was said that ‘no stout-hearted man could endure’ such appalling work, ‘yet they were enduring it’, for now at least. One pro-French near-contemporary later observed that, with the momentum growing towards a Frankish assault, King Philip ‘could easily have taken the city had he wished’, but elected to wait for Richard’s arrival so that they could share in the victory. This may have been an exaggeration, and it is doubtful that Philip truly would have shown such forbearance, but it is all too easy, amidst the glare of the Lionheart’s legend, to forget that it was the Capetian and not the Angevin monarch who first breathed new, reinvigorating life into the Third Crusade.47
The Lionheart at Acre
Even so, Richard’s grand, drama-laden landfall at Acre on 8 June did serve to tip the balance of military power in the Latins’ favour. Comparing the two Christian monarchs, a Muslim eyewitness observed: ‘[The English king] had much experience of fighting and was intrepid in battle, and yet he was in their eyes below the king of France in royal status, although being richer and more renowned for martial skill and courage.’ The Lionheart arrived in the Near East with many of England’s and Normandy’s most powerful nobles–the likes of Robert IV, earl of Leicester, and Roger of Tosny–men who held major estates on both sides of the Channel. He was also accompanied by an inner circle of familiares, or household knights–fiercely loyal warriors like Andrew of Chauvigny.48
Richard came to the Holy Land with more men, far deeper financial reserves and a much larger navy than King Philip. Indeed, at the head of the twenty-five-ship-strong advance guard of his fleet, the English monarch managed to score his first military success against Saladin even before setting foot on the Levantine mainland. Sailing south from Tyre, en route to Acre, Richard came across a huge Muslim supply ship in the region of Sidon. This vessel had set out from Ayyubid-held Beirut, packed with seven emirs, 700 elite troops, food, weapons and many phials of Greek fire, as well as 200 ‘very deadly snakes’ which ‘[the Muslims] intended to let loose among the [Christian] army’. With a drop in the wind Richard managed to catch up to this craft and, seeing through its Muslim crew’s attempt to pass themselves off as Frenchmen, launched an attack. Facing fierce resistance, unable to board and capture the ship intact, Richard settled for ramming and sinking it to ensure that its precious cargo never reached the enemy. To capitalise fully upon the demoralising effect of this defeat, a single prisoner was later mutilated and sent into Acre bearing news of the disaster.
Upon reaching the siege, Richard set up his camp to the north of the city, Philip having taken up a position to the east. The Lionheart immediately set about assessing ‘how the city could be seized in the shortest time, what means, what cunning, what siege engines must be used’. But just as he was readying himself for war, barely a week after having set foot in the Holy Land, the king was unmanned by illness. In stark counterpoint to his naval triumph and the majesty of his arrival, Richard suddenly found himself confined to his tent for days by a scurvy-like affliction called arnaldia by contemporaries; soon his teeth and fingernails began to loosen and patches of his hair fell out. The humiliation must have been hard to bear, not least because sickness could so easily be interpreted as a sign of divine ill favour. In Saladin’s camp the king’s misery was seen as a blessing, because it ‘discouraged [the Franks] from making their attacks’. Yet even in a state of infirmity, Richard proved himself capable of advancing the crusaders’ cause.49
Showing a subtlety that might seem to belie his reputation for raw bellicosity, the English monarch immediately set about opening diplomatic channels of communication with Saladin. Experience in the West had taught the Lionheart that in the medieval world victory came to those who could marry the disciplines of politics and warfare. He showed absolutely no compunction in employing negotiation as a weapon in the struggle with the supposed ‘infidel’, although for now at least these contacts were kept secret from the crusader host. Richard began, even before the onset of his illness, by seeking a personal meeting with Saladin. An envoy was dispatched to request a parley, but the sultan responded with a courteous but firm rejection: ‘Kings do not meet unless an agreement has been reached’, he apparently replied; ‘it is not good for them to fight after meeting and eating together.’