These two documents reveal that within weeks of Nur al-Din’s death Saladin was publicising the official agenda under which he would operate through much of the 1170s. In the years to come he sought, with almost unfailing tenacity, to extend his own personal authority over the shattered remnants of Nur al-Din’s realm. But always this grasping pursuit of power was veiled beneath the public avowal of twinned principles: that as al-Salih’s appointed guardian Saladin laboured tirelessly, and without regard for his own reward, to preserve Zangid authority; and that this drive towards Islamic unity was of paramount importance precisely because the Muslim world was engaged in a historic struggle with an implacable Christian foe, who even now retained possession of the sacred city of Jerusalem.³⁶

Of course, many of the sultan’s contemporary opponents were only too aware that Saladin actually was trying to build his own empire, even if it was one constructed in the interests of jihad, and they were often willing to publicise their fears and accusations. Under these circumstances, Saladin relied upon the politics of fear to lend force to his programme of dissimulation. If matters proceeded peacefully in Syria, the sultan would have no excuse to intervene–somewhat ironically, in 1174 Saladin thus hoped that his rivals would act against al-Salih’s interests and that the Franks would go on the offensive.

The occupation of Damascus

Given his base of operations in Egypt, Saladin’s first objective in seeking to reconsolidate Nur al-Din’s dominions under his own rule had to be Damascus. Seizing upon Ibn al-Muqaddam’s decision to buy peace with the kingdom of Jerusalem at Banyas, the sultan now levelled allegations of weakness against the Damascene court, citing its failure to pursue the holy war as a probable cause to intervene in Syrian affairs. Nur al-Din’s former secretary, the Persian scribe and scholar Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, recorded the exchange of correspondence that followed. Ibn al-Muqaddam chided Saladin, writing, ‘let it not be said that you have designs upon the house of the one who established you [as] this does not befit your good character’. The sultan responded with a forceful assertion of his intentions:

We choose for Islam and its people only what will unite them, and for the [Zangid] house only what will preserve its root and its branches…I am in one valley and those who think evil of me are in another…If we had inclined to any other path, we would not have chosen the way of consultation and writing.

This was the message that Saladin wished to broadcast throughout Syria, but, stirring as his words may have been, they were unlikely to sway policy on their own. In all probability it was fear of a potential alliance between Mosul and Aleppo that, by summer’s end, prompted Ibn al-Muqaddam to side with Saladin, inviting him to come to the aid of Damascus. This was precisely the opportunity that the sultan had hoped for. Leaving his brother al-Adil to govern Egypt, Saladin marched into Syria in October 1174 equipped with two weapons: an army with which to overcome any pockets of resistance and, perhaps more importantly, tens of thousands of gold dinars to buy support. His entry into the ancient city on 28 October proved to be a peaceful affair.

One of Saladin’s contemporary biographers described the day, taking care to emphasise the sultan’s personal connection to Damascus, home of his youth, writing that ‘he went straight to his house and people flocked to him rejoicing’. His lavish largesse likewise was highlighted: ‘That same day he distributed huge sums of money to the people and showed himself pleased and delighted with the Damascenes, as they did with him. He went up into the citadel and his power was firmly established.’ To emphasise the orthodox quality and magnanimity of his rule, Saladin went to pray in the Grand Umayyad Mosque, ordered the immediate revocation of non-Koranic taxation and forbade looting. He later justified his occupation of the city as a step on the road to retaking Jerusalem, arguing that ‘to hold back from the holy war is a crime for which there can be no excuse’. But many remained unconvinced by Saladin’s claims–Jurdik, his former ally in Egypt, for one, sided with Aleppo. Even the Franks living in Palestine were aware of the incipient power struggle and one Latin contemporary noted that Saladin’s occupation of Damascus contravened ‘the loyalty he owed to his lord and master [al-Salih]’.³⁷

Nonetheless, in the closing months of 1174, a number of Syria’s Muslim potentates decided to back Saladin–judging that this was their best chance of survival–and the sultan was able to extend his authority northwards in a series of largely bloodless campaigns, seizing control of Homs, Hama and Baalbek (where Ibn al-Muqaddam was duly rewarded for his support with a command). Once again, Saladin took great care to justify these conquests. After taking Homs he wrote in a public dispatch back to Egypt, ‘our move was not made in order to snatch a kingdom for ourselves, but to set up the standard of the holy war’. His opponents in Syria had, he argued, ‘become enemies, preventing the accomplishment of our purpose with regard to this war’. He also stressed that he had taken care not to damage the town of Homs itself, ‘knowing how close it was to the unbelievers’. However, a more personal letter, written around the same time to his nephew Farrukh-Shah (an increasingly prominent lieutenant), seems to offer a less gilded view of events. Here Saladin bluntly criticised the ‘feeble minds’ of Homs’ populace and acknowledged that cultivating his own reputation for justice and clemency was the ‘key to the lands’. He even managed to joke about his future prospects. His primary objective was now Aleppo, the name of which in Arabic (Halab) also means ‘milk’. Saladin forecast that city’s imminent fall, writing that ‘we have only to do the milking and Aleppo will be ours’.³⁸

Stalking Aleppo

By the start of 1175, Saladin was certainly in a position to threaten Aleppo, but in spite of his rather bold prediction, that city proved to be an intractable obstacle, stalling the extension of his authority over all Syria for years to come. Aleppo’s formidable citadel and strong garrison meant that any attempt at an assault siege would require patience and extensive military resources. But even if successful, such a direct approach likely would lead to a protracted and bloody conflict–not a conquest that would sit comfortably alongside Saladin’s preferred image as a humble guardian of Islam. The sultan must have hoped that his opponents would give him grounds to attack the city, perhaps by abusing or even murdering al-Salih, but Gumushtegin was far too astute to make such an obvious blunder. The young Zangid heir, the seed of legitimacy, was more valuable alive as a puppet ruler within Aleppo. Indeed, Gumushtegin even persuaded the boy to deliver an emotive, tearful speech to the city’s populace, begging for their protection against Saladin’s tyranny.

To compound Saladin’s problems, the rulers of Aleppo and Mosul put aside their differences in order to unite against the threatening tide of Ayyubid rule. Over the next year and a half Saladin remained in Syria, prosecuting a succession of limited and largely inconclusive sieges of Aleppo and its satellite settlements. In April 1175, and then again a year later in April 1176, he met Aleppan–Mosuli forces in pitched battle, winning convincing victories on both occasions. These two confrontations enhanced the sultan’s burgeoning reputation as Islam’s leading general, while proving the marked superiority of his increasingly experienced Egyptian and Damascene armies. But in practical terms they proved indecisive. Convinced that lasting dominion of Syria could not be achieved when stained with Muslim blood, Saladin sought to limit the degree of actual inter-Muslim combat that took place, relying upon troop discipline rather than martial ferocity to prevail and curtailing any harrying of his retreating foes once they had been driven from the field. His opponents were thus permitted to lick their wounds and regroup.