Göring chose this day to call his Air Fleet commanders to The Hague for a conference. They reached no agreement about results so far achieved. "Smiling Albert' Kesselring was his usual optimistic self, and inclined to believe German intelligence reports that the RAF had very few fighter aircraft left. Hugo Sperrle's experiences had left him more sceptical. He preferred to believe that the RAF had anything up to 1,000 fighters left.

In spite of the sun at The Hague this day, there could be no arguing about the approach of winter weather. The three men agreed that the RAF fighter force must be brought into battle more quickly. London was surely a target that the British would defend with every fighter they possessed. Hitler had forbidden 'terror raids' against residential districts, but the Luftwaffe could send their bombers to the London docks, which were considered legitimate military targets.

For the RAF there was little comfort to come from the day's fighting. Sixteen RAF fighters were lost for sixteen of the enemy, the only consolation being that eight pilots were safe. In just two weeks of fighting Dowding had lost 25 per cent of his pilots. Neither did this mean that he could fight another six weeks with the remainder. Long before that. Fighter Command would cease to be a disciplined fighting force. Even at this moment, a quarter of his pilots were fresh from only a few flying hours at Operational Training Units, and with less than two weeks' squadron experience. He had only to keep September's skies too dangerous for a German invasion in order to force a postponement to 1941. But at this loss rate it seemed impossible.

In response to a Luftwaffe Operations Staff IA order dated 1 September, attacks were directed to thirty aircraft factories. On the first day of this new policy, the Vickers-Armstrong factory at Brooklands was bombed, causing 700 casualties.

Phase Four: 7 September Onwards, the Daylight Attacks Centre on London

Hitherto, Hitler had forbidden raids upon London but the RAF continued to bomb Berlin after the first attack on the night of 24–25 August, and Hitler became angry enough to relax his veto. He said terror raids on central London could begin.

After his capture, in 1945, Göring spoke of this period. He claimed that while he had wanted to continue the attacks on the airfields, Hitler had demanded retribution. However, no other evidence supports this claim. No Luftwaffe commander, no memoir, diary, or memo shows Göring reluctant about the new policy. In fact Göring recalled Milch to his Air Ministry desk and came west himself. And on the afternoon of Saturday 7 September, when Göring, Loerzer, and Kesselring stood on the cliffs at Cap Blanc Nez watching the German formations head for London, Göring had already announced over the radio, "I myself have taken command of the Luftwaffe's battle for Britain."

In order to supplement his forces, and replace so many bomber casualties, Kesselring had been given KG 26, the Lbwen-Geschwader, and KG 30, the Adler-Geschwader, from Air Fleet 5. It was a measure of the fighting that these two units, with a paper strength of 240 aircraft, could provide less than 40 serviceable ones.

Altogether the huge bombing formation that Göring watched numbered nearly 1,000 aircraft. About a third of these were bombers. The formation looked like a vast black storm cloud, for it was nearly two miles high, and covered about 800 square miles!

It has been suggested that the intercepted Enigma signals that British intelligence supplied to Dowding and Park (although not to the other commanders) warned them of German intentions, but on the English side of the Channel Park had no idea that London was to be the target for this daylight raid. On this Saturday he had gone to Fighter Command HQ, which shows that Dowding too had no warning of the huge air assault of this day.

Park had given his staff and all concerned a sharp rebuke about the practice of adding a little height to the estimation that came from the radar. By the time Group, and then the Sector Controller, and finally the squadron had all added to the estimated height of the 'bandits' (to avoid the risk of arriving under them), some of the lower German formations were getting in, and back, unintercepted Park pointed out that on one occasion the previous day, only seven out of eighteen squadrons vectored on the enemy made contact.

Because of the way in which Leigh-Mallory had failed to protect Debden on 26 August, Park had now ordered his squadrons at North Weald, Debden, and Hornchurch not to fly south on interceptions until Leigh-Mallory's promised units had arrived over their bases.

The Observer Corps saw the Germans approaching the east coast of Kent, near Deal. From the course of the German raid Park's Controller guessed that their track would pass into an attack against those very sector stations that Leigh-Mallory was charged to defend. Therefore, instead of sending his squadrons well forward, as had become Park's routine for defending the sector stations south of London, the Controller played safe. He kept most of his squadrons north of the Thames.

Once again the 50-year-old Fink was leading KG 2 in the van of the attack. Already he had seen his fighter escort turn back as their fuel ran short. Unescorted, he turned to attack targets in East London. Behind him came other waves of bombers to hit docks and factories on London's river. Only after the main force had bombed did the RAF Controllers fully realize that London was the German target, and bring the full strength of Fighter Command into action.

In the subsequent fighting, the RAF suffered a marginal defeat. The German fighter escorts had evolved a series of counter-moves for each type of attack. For instance, an attack from the starboard side to draw the fighter escort away did not do so, because the top-cover moved down to cover the starboard flank while the port escort moved up to top-cover position. These tactics frustrated Park's system of sending a Hurricane and a Spitfire squadron into action in unison, the latter to attack the fighters, the former to attack the bombers. To add to Fighter Command's difficulties, the German formations were flying much higher than usual 16,000 to 20,000 feet at the very day when all concerned were meticulous about not adding a few thousand feet extra for safety's sake. This higher-altitude fighting left the blue sky woven with hundreds of condensation trails that made the Battle visible to watchers on the ground.

Bader was ordered to orbit 11 Group's sector airfield at North Weald, but according to his biographer, "Bader disobeyed instructions again' and chased the Germans, climbing steeply to 15,000 feet so as to leave his big-wing formation 'trailing, unable to keep up." He attacked the Germans, who were formed 'in a straggle from below with 109s on top. No chance to break them up. No time for tactics."

Not surprisingly, Bader's big wing performed disappointingly enough for Leigh-Mallory to write excuses to Dowding, saying that they 'were at a disadvantage through the loss of any element of surprise, through having to climb up to get at the enemy, and through the enemy fighters coming down at them from the sun."

One of the worst aspects of Leigh-Mallory's unilateral behaviour was the way in which it affected the co-operation between the Groups. At one time 12 Group Controllers had like those of 10 Group on the right flank been keen to help in concert with any tactics decided upon by 11 Group: By September, the feud between the two commanders had resulted in a complete loss of contact between their respective Controllers. So much so that 11 Group sometimes watched the Germans evade the big wings with no way of helping the interception except by sending messages through Fighter Command HQ.