It was an act of faith to send the jamming signals into the ether, not knowing how effective were these counter-measures. And yet on the night of 14–15 November there came a horrifying indication of what was being achieved; it was one that the experts would readily have forgone. An error in the adjustment of the modulation made it relatively easy to distinguish the sound of the signal from the sound of the jamming.1 KGr 100 put over 1,000 incendiaries precisely onto Coventry to lead three separate streams of bombers there with high explosive.

But that was the high-water mark of X-Gerat. And the

"In spite of recent nonsense written about Churchill and the Enigma machine, this technical error was the sole reason that the German attack was so successful.

The Results effectiveness of the marking technique was reduced by the way in which decoy fires were lighted in the open countryside, while town fire-services did all they could to extinguish the German incendiary attack.

As Christmas approached, the German Embassy in Washington made secret contact with their British counterparts to say that they would observe a bombing truce from Christmas Eve until 27 December if the RAF would do the same. They did.

As the air assault against England dwindled into harassing daylight attacks and a night offensive, the RAF High Command acted more vindictively against the two men who had succeeded than did Göring against the men who had failed.

Dowding and Park had committed an unforgivable sin in the eyes of the Air Ministry and their other critics: they had proved their theories right. In a manner more appropriate to the already obvious failure of Bomber Command than to the remarkable achievements of Fighter Command, the Air Ministry called a meeting to discuss the Battle.

Not knowing what to expect, Park and Dowding went along to find a gathering of what Beaverbrook always referred to as 'the bloody Air Marshals." It must have been an astonishing experience for these two weary victors. The room was arranged so that they faced a mighty array of top brass. Conspicuous among it there was only one low-ranking officer. It was Douglas Bader.

Although Sholto-Douglas was only an Air Vice-Marshal, he now held the office of Deputy Chief of Air Staff, which gave him authority over Dowding. He chaired this Alice-in-Wonderland meeting, and was, in Park's words, 'the public prosecutor," while, 'sitting in an honoured place at the table, was Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory, supported by Squadron Leader Douglas Bader."

Bader had been a civilian after his flying accident in 1931. Still young, the legless ace had now completed eight months' RAF service. It was perhaps awesome for him to face Dowding, by now the most senior officer by rank and experience of anyone still serving. Dowding had been an Air Chief Marshal since 1937.

Leigh-Mallory explained to the meeting the way in which, according to him, the big-wing tactics had proved superior to the methods of Park. Not content with this, he then called upon the young Douglas Bader to elaborate upon Park's shortcomings.

Although Leigh-Mallory had no practical experience of the special problems of commanding the vital south-east region, he was an eloquent critic of his colleague. He contended that he could get the five squadrons, of the Duxford wing into the air in 6 minutes. In another 25 minutes they could be as far as Hornchurch. But as the ace fighter pilot and historian Johnnie Johnson later pointed out, 'the Duxford wing had recently taken 17 minutes to leave the ground and a further 20 minutes before it set course from base." And Johnson also remarked on the way in which such a concentration of aircraft left many important Midlands targets without air protection.

Young Bader went much further than his boss. He, according to his biographer, told the meeting 'that the chap in the air, not the Controller, should decide when, where and how to meet the enemy." It was a complete rejection of the whole interception system, and radar too.

Park had no doubt that the whole humiliating charade was contrived as a pretext for sacking Dowding and himself. He remembered the way that the Deputy Chief of Air Staff seemed pleased at the way the meeting was conducted.

Dowding did not fight them; it was not his style. By now his career should have taken him into the back-stabbing world where the military met the politicos, but Dowding had spent four wearying years preparing Fighter Command for the battle he had only just won. And the years before that had been entirely concerned with the technicalities of fighter aircraft design, equipment, organization, research, and radar. Like many technicians he was a political innocent.

It is sad comment on Dowding's lonely life that General Sir Frederick Pile, the AA gun commander, perhaps the only associate to whom Dowding spoke freely, described him as voluble, not realizing that he was Dowding's only friend. That Dowding made so many enemies isn't surprising, but that the Air Ministry and RAF should subject him to petty humiliations and harassments, even during the Battle, is one of the most extraordinary episodes of the war. That Churchill permitted it is a reflection upon that great man's judgment."

Many years later Park said, "To my dying day I shall feel bitter at the base intrigue which was used to remove Dowding and myself as soon as we had won the Battle of Britain."

Dowding had a curt phone call telling him to vacate his office in twenty-four hours. The Air Council 'have no further work to offer you," said the official letter. He was not even permitted to stay in the RAF. Park was relegated to Training Command and Leigh-Mallory took over his Group.

Hitler had taken close interest in the plans for the attack on Poland, and made improvements in it. For the assault on Denmark and Norway, he had used his office of OKW (command of the combined armed forces) to keep a large degree of personal control. Planning the invasion of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands he had encouraged the idea of putting the weight of the thrust upon Sedan, which in

"It is sometimes said that Churchill knew nothing of the sacking of Dowding and Park, and that he had no authority to prevent it. But Churchill had day-to-day control of the war and wrote detailed memos on everything from providing sugar rations for bee keepers to allowing women in the army (ATS) to leave the service when they married. And he was Minister of Defence, and was not only kept informed of such decisions but had the authority to instruct the Chiefs of Staff without reference to other Ministers.

the event proved the key to the victory. In the air assault against Britain, Hitler took no interest at all.

Hitler was one of the most successful opportunists of the twentieth century. (As the historian A. J. P. Taylor has shown in detail, there was no Nazi plan of war and expansion.) His interest in Sea-lion was a long-shot wager on the hope of Britain's intimidation and collapse. It failed; Hitler shrugged and fingered maps of Russia.

Although the British considered themselves fully engaged in a desperate and dangerous war. Hitler saw the situation differently. The western front was secure no danger there of any British invasion of the mainland and there was time enough for a 'quick war' against Russia.1

In any case, it had long been a fundamental belief of the German military thinkers that victory over Britain could only be gained by severing its sea routes. Although virtually all nations prepare contingency plans for war against their neighbours (including their closest allies), Germany did not draft any plans for a war against Britain until June 1937. And the Luftwaffe did not draw up memoranda about air attacks on Britain until February 1938. It is worth looking at these evaluations.