Wejh had been taken as a base from which the Arabs could cut the Hejaz railway, and Feisal’s ultimate objective remained the slow strangling and final capture of Medina. In one sense, his march on Wejh had been an overwhelming success – it had mobilized the Bedu tribes of the northern Hejaz and beyond, and brought them flocking to the Hashemite colours. In February alone, Feisal received visitors from the Shararat, the Howaytat, the Bani ‘Atiya and the Rwalla – tribes from Syria or the Syrian marches – and from the Wuld ‘Ali and Billi tribes of the Hejaz. His aim was to mould the tribes into an ‘Arab Nation’, and his first task was to try to end the blood-feuds which had riven them for generations. He listened carefully and patiently to every petitioner, investigating the history of every claimed wrong, balancing the rival claims with diyya or ‘blood-money’ where this was acceptable, or invoking the cause of Arab solidarity in the name of his father Hussain, the King of the Hejaz, where it was not. Adherents to the cause were made to swear to Feisal personally on the Holy Quran that they would ‘wait while he waited, march when he marched, yield obedience to no Turk, deal kindly with all who spoke Arabic … and put independence above life, family and goods …’2 The Bedu swore, but whether they believed themselves to be an ‘Arab nation’ is doubtful. They hated the Turks, wanted them out of their tribal districts, and were willing to go along with the Hashemites towards this end, but they valued their independence more highly than gold, and if their thoughts strayed beyond their own territory, it was generally in terms of gain or plunder: their nation would always be the tribe, the tribe and the tribe.
Already, Lawrence noticed, the Juhayna were drifting back to their homes in the Wadi Yanbu’, feeling themselves foreigners in Billi country. Ironically, it was only the ‘Agayl, who were neither a tribe nor even nomads, who were willing to travel far beyond their own frontiers, and the ‘Agayl had troubles of their own. On 12 February they mutinied against their leader ‘Abdallah ibn Dakhil, ransacked his tent, and thrashed his guards, then rushed the camp of the ‘Utayba, with whom they had a blood-feud. They were dissuaded only by Feisal himself, who strode among them barefoot, laying about with the flat of his sword, but by the time peace had been restored two men had been killed and thirty wounded. As for Lawrence, his temporary assignment with Feisal was now officially completed, for Newcombe was in the field to replace him. However, Feisal and Lawrence had grown attached to each other, and neither wished to part from the other in medias res. Lawrence saw that his place was to be official adviser and unofficial spur of the Arab Revolt. On the day they had ridden into Wejh, a cable had reached Clayton from Jeddah containing Feisal’s personal request that Lawrence should stay with him, since he had been ‘of very great assistance’.3 Clayton had no choice but to accept. On 1 March he wrote to Major Hugh Pearson – who had temporarily replaced Wilson in Jeddah – that ‘Lawrence with Feisal is of inestimable value and an Englishman to take a corresponding place with ‘Ali could immensely increase the probability of cooperation among the armies’.4 It was inevitable, given Lawrence’s faculty for empathy, that he should identify with the Arabs and the Arab Revolt, and he now felt his hand on the reins of power. His earlier reservations about being in the field were forgotten, and he became engrossed in his work to the exclusion of almost everything else. Now, dressing habitually in Arab robes, speaking Arabic constantly, he had stepped into his Arab persona and had half forgotten that he was a captain in the British army, regarding himself of being ‘of Sharif Feisal’s household’. He had ‘chosen’ Feisal as the revolt’s figurehead, and he alone would guide him to victory. He knew that Feisal was easily influenced, and since this was so, he intended to be the Sharif’s adviser for as long as he could: ‘The position I have is a queer one,’ he wrote home, ‘I do not suppose any Englishman before ever had such a place.’5 Feisal had come to rely on Lawrence because he recognized that the Englishman had a quality indispensable to a true leader – he inspired confidence. Lawrence could not only generate great charm, but was one of those individuals who always seemed to be able to supply the right answer, who always appeared to know the right course, and was always capable of reassuring others that things would turn out for the best. As Sir Herbert Baker later said, ‘he appeared to radiate a magnetic influence’.6 Although Lawrence’s self-assured demeanour actually disguised an inner lack of confidence, and a turmoil of doubt, like his mother Sarah he showed a different face to the world. His influence was subtle, however. He did not try to dictate strategy to Feisal, neither did he harangue Arab councils with his opinions. He did not command, but suggested a course: ‘… he would make brilliant suggestions,’ Leonard Woolley commented, ‘but would seldom argue in support of them: they were based on sound enough arguments, but he would expect you to see these for yourself, and if you did not agree he would relapse into silence and smile.’7 In his Twenty-Seven Articles, intended as advice for other officers dealing with the Hashemites, Lawrence revealed his modus operandi with Feisal: he would try to ensure that the Sharif first put his plans before him privately, and would always accept them and praise them, and then modify them imperceptibly by drawing suggestions from Feisal himself, until they accorded with Lawrence’s own opinion. Once they were in agreement, he would hold him to it firmly and push him, so subtly that the Sharif was hardly aware of it, towards its execution. In front of others, though, he would always appear to defer to the Sharif, and would strengthen Feisal’s prestige at the expense of his own. While in the Sharif’s camp, he would not visit him formally, but would remain in his company constantly, eating with him and being present at all audiences, continually dropping ideas into the casual talk. When tribal Sheikhs came to declare for the Hashemites, though, Lawrence would vanish, realizing that a first impression of foreigners in Feisal’s confidence would do harm to the cause. Lawrence brought his immense powers of concentration to bear on the Sharif’s affairs and immersed himself totally in Arab culture: he watched and listened and chewed over every detail, delved into motives and machinations beneath the surface, analysed the characters he had to deal with. He was always on his guard, tried never to speak unnecessarily, constantly watched himself and his actions. Pierce Joyce, who saw him at dozens of conferences with the Arabs, recalled that he rarely spoke: ‘He merely studied the men around him, ‘Joyce said; ‘he knew beforehand that his plan would be accepted, while the task of kindling enthusiasm among the tribesmen was best left to the Arab leaders.’ ‘It was not as is often supposed by his individual leadership of hordes of Bedu that he achieved success … but by the wise selection of leaders and providing the essential grist to the mill in the shape of golden rewards for work well done.’8
Lawrence was aware that the march on Wejh had been a great moral triumph for the Hashemite cause, but to professional British officers, who were less aware of the nature of a propaganda war, the Arabs had been found wanting – their major successes had been made possible only by the Royal Navy. Lawrence realized that a more independent victory was needed to vindicate the movement in the eyes of his British commanders, and to vindicate himself personally, for he was well aware of what officers such as Bray and Vickery thought of Feisal’s failure to make the rendezvous at Wejh, and of his part in that failure. A startling coup by the Arabs was needed to make the British stand up. That chance seemed to be offering itself when, on 10 March, the patrol ship Nural-Bahr put into Wejh with the electrifying news that Fakhri Pasha had been ordered to evacuate Medina with all his force.