I supervised pre-battle preparations in our base camp. At midnight on the night of 4–5 June, my 2nd and 3rd Companies and the mortar battery moved out. The 2nd Company’s mission was to take one mortar platoon and block the west wall of the valley by 0400 hours. My 3rd Company, with the other mortar platoon, was to block all exits along the east wall of the valley by 0400 hours.

Map 10: Combat actions in Varduj Valley.

My 2nd Company completed its mission and moved into position by 0300 on 5 June. The mujahideen did not detect their arrival. At 0345 hours, as my 3rd Company was closing onto its positions, the enemy discovered it and fired on it from the hill north of hill 246.0. Our mortar platoon returned fire and killed the enemy. Fifteen minutes later, the 3rd Company established its blocking positions.

At 0400 hours, the 3rd Platoon of my 2nd Company was attacked by 25 mujahideen supported by a mortar. The enemy attacked from the east and the platoon was blinded by the rising sun. The platoon withdrew from its position on hill 224.6 and moved south to join the 2nd Platoon. At the same time, my 2nd Company command post (located on hill 246.4 with the 1st Platoon) came under attack.

As soon as I understood the situation, I ordered the 2nd Company’s bronegruppa (which was under my control) and the bronegruppa of the 1st Company (my sweeping company) to join forces with my reserve (my reconnaissance platoon). I directed them to retake the 3rd Platoon’s position on Hill 224.6, destroy the mujahideen who were supporting the enemy withdrawal and seal off the mujahideen escape route to the west. They accomplished their mission, killing seven mujahideen, capturing six prisoners and seizing 11 weapons. Our forces swept the valley, but made no further contact. The enemy had “melted” into the population. During the sweep we found a food cache with 90 tons of grain.

Frunze Commentary: The following points should be noted from this action:

the battalion commander’s skillful control of the battle manifested by his rapid transfer of reserve forces and forces from inactive areas to the threatened sector;

the lack of mutual fire support and coordination between platoons operating on the same axis;

the inability of the junior commanders to rapidly organize and lay in a defensive fire plan;

the lack of skill displayed by the personnel in quickly creating fighting positions and tying in their defenses with mortar fires;

the lack of FSCs accompanying the subunits to adjust artillery fire, which lessened the effectiveness of the attached artillery.

Editor’s Commentary: The bronegruppa concept is excellent for providing a quick reaction reserve and for moving fire power into a threatened sector. Mechanized infantry must train to function away from their personnel carriers.

11. Sequential blocking and sweeping of a mountain valley near Anushella

by Major P. A. Skovorodnikov²⁴

In February and March 1986, guerrilla activities were recorded in the area of Kandahar, Kalat and Shar-e-Safa including attacks on Soviet and Afghan convoys, road mining, shellings of military camps and security outposts, and the armed protection of guerrilla caravans carrying weapons and ammunition from Pakistan.

LTC V. N. Tsarev, the commander of the air assault battalion²⁵ and my boss, received the following mission: “Prepare to move out in several days to conduct a block and sweep action to destroy the enemy in the valley near Anushella. The action will also involve the Brigade’s 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion minus one of its companies (the 1st MRB was commanded by LTC A. G. Ivanov).”

Training and rehearsals for this action began on 16 March and concentrated on combat in mountains, clearing and overcoming minefields and boobytraps, night combat, sealing off caves and killing their defenders, evacuation of wounded from the mountains, and the destruction of supply caches by explosives (this last training was done in conjunction with attached sappers – each company had an attached sapper squad for this action). The train-up ended with a full battalion tactical exercise.

The battalion commander refined his final orders at 2000 hours on 24 March and issued them to his subordinates at 2200 hours.

“The 1st MRB (minus its 3rd Company) will establish successive blocking positions on the eastern wall of the canyon and deny the enemy a break-out to the east. The blocking force must be in place by 0600 hours on 25 March. This 1st MRB will be supported by a flight of Mi-24 helicopter gunships.

“The 3rd Air Assault Company will establish a series of successive blocking positions also running from the south to the north on the west wall of the canyon to deny the enemy a break-out to the west. This blocking force must be in place by 0600 hours on 25 March.

“The rest of the air assault battalion will block the southern exit of the canyon. The battalion is reinforced with a tank platoon, an anti-tank battery, a flamethrower platoon, and a sapper platoon. Two self-propelled howitzer battalions, a battery of BM-22 “Hurricane” (RSZO) 220mm MRLS, a squadron of Su-25 “FROGFOOT” close-air support aircraft, and a flight of Mi-24 helicopter gunships will provide fire support to the battalion. At 0630 hours on 25 March, following an artillery preparation, the battalion will begin to sweep north to destroy the enemy and capture his ammunition caches.”

The force moved out on time and occupied their attack positions. The artillery fired a 25-minute preparation. The artillery fire plan included scatterable mines (RDM) which were fired to block any mujahideen withdrawal to the north. Following the artillery preparation, the battalion began its sweep.

Map 11: Successive blocks while sweeping a mountain valley.

An artillery forward observer accompanied each company of the 1st MRB as well as the 3rd Air Assault Company. An aviation combat control group (GBU) also accompanied the 1st MRB. The 1st MRB and the 3rd Air Assault Company seized the dominant terrain. They controlled the canyon walls and blocked the paths from the canyon with part of their force while leapfrogging the other part of their force north to establish the next position. In this manner, they were constantly able to support the air assault battalion in its sweep of the canyon.

By 1430 hours, the sweep had been completed. In the course of combat, we killed up to 20 mujahideen, captured and evacuated several weapons caches and captured and destroyed several ammunition caches.

Frunze Commentary: We found that when conducting a block and sweep of a canyon, it was best to accomplish the approach march and get into attack positions at night. Further, close cooperation between the blocking and sweeping forces was absolutely crucial in order to maintain the tempo of the sweep and accomplish the task on time. These were done well.

However, there were shortcomings in this action. The artillery and aviation support could have been used more effectively. There were many causes for this. Too much time was wasted during a call-for-fire. The mujahideen had enough time to move the bulk of their force into the safety of caves while maintaining observers in the fighting positions. The enemy was able to deceive our aviation by displaying our panel markings for friendly forces on their positions. RDM mines were not delivered accurately enough and the gaps between RDM minefields allowed a significant portion of the mujahideen to escape to the north. Further, the enemy discovered our movement into the area in sufficient time to mine the entrance to the valley and the passes.