Finally, our study of this example shows that the block and sweep of the enemy requires an ever-larger, heterogeneous force, including the most modern and effective combat means. This action involved only Soviet forces and excluded Afghan government forces.

Editor’s Commentary: Airpower is great and helicopter gunships can save the day when things have gone bad. However, using standard or SOP displays of panels or pyrotechnics to mark friendly positions or communicate with pilots is risky. The enemy is quick to learn these codes and to use them against the force which needs air support. What is really needed is the capability of ground forces to talk directly to air forces.

12. Blocking and sweeping an inhabited region

by LTC V. V. Shubin²⁶

Divisions [formations] and regiments [units] of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan conducted operations in the province of Kandahar from March to the first days of September 1986. They inflicted such appreciable casualties on the guerrilla forces that the majority of them left for the safe haven of Pakistan.

By the beginning of September, active combat had ceased. The Afghan command decided to allow its forces the time to conduct training and to rest in their base camps. Consequently, on 6 September, the regiments of the 9th Infantry Division began moving out in march column to their camps in Ghazni Province.

The march took the division through Zabol Province, where five or six guerrilla forces with a total of approximately 500 men were located. The local guerrilla leader Pahlawan commanded these mujahideen. They were located near the border with Pakistan and were well-armed with recoilless rifles, mortars, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guided missile systems. They knew the local terrain very well and could quickly and secretly maneuver their forces and equipment throughout the area.

The terrain in this area is mountainous and semi-desert in places. The guerrillas used the extensive Karez underground irrigation system for ambushes. The enemy knew about the movement of the 9th Infantry Division. Since the road network in this area was poorly developed, the enemy knew at what time which forces would pass through the narrow sections on the Kandahar-Ghazni route.

Map 12: Blocking and destroying enemy ambushes in an inhabited area.

At 0500 hours on 7 September, two explosions ripped apart the roadbed close to the village of Shingali-Kalay. Simultaneously, a mujahideen ambush opened fire with every weapon at its disposal. Within the first few minutes, they destroyed four tanks, three BTRs²⁷ and seven trucks.

A part of the division column, including the division commander, was able to force its way through the blocked passage and escape to the province center of Kalat. It arrived at 0520 hours. The division commander requested assistance from the commander of the provincial “Sarandoy”.²⁸ The province authority agreed to dispatch the 35th Operational Battalion reinforced with a company of the KHAD²⁹ to aid the trapped subunits.

The province’s plan was to draw the guerrilla main force into the battle, hit them with aviation and artillery fire, and then simultaneously attack them from the flank and rear to destroy them. The battalion commander formed his force into two columns. The first column consisted of the 1st and 3rd Companies of the 35th Battalion plus the KHAD company. The second column was the 2nd Company of the 35th Battalion. The columns moved out at 0600 hours.

Artillery strikes and helicopter gunships fired preparatory fires from 0610 to 0625 hours. At 0630 hours, the flanking detachment (2nd Company) radioed that it was in its designated position. A battalion subunit then gave the signal and the battalion hit the enemy in the flank and rear. The enemy abandoned their casualties, weapons and ammunition and withdrew. Enemy losses were 27 KIA and 36 WIA. The Afghan government forces captured two recoilless rifles, six mortars, two DShK 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, three RPG anti-tank grenade launchers, two crates of grenades and six AKM assault rifles. Losses of the 35th Operational Battalion were two killed and six wounded.

Frunze Commentary: The successful blocking and destruction of enemy ambushes was made possible by a variety of factors;

the rapid assembly of personnel and the readiness of weapons and equipment for combat;

the resourcefulness and military cunning of the battalion commander;

the thorough knowledge of the local terrain; and

the correct determination of the probable enemy course of action.

At the same time, the flanking detachment did not completely fulfill its mission to cut off the enemy withdrawal. There were several contributing factors. Reconnaissance devoted scant attention to determining the location of enemy combat outposts and early warning posts. There were isolated instances of command and control failures during the battle since the CP was located away from the battle. Finally, there was insufficient fire suppression on the withdrawing enemy.

Further combat analysis shows that the enemy studied the terrain and the convoy structure carefully and selected his ambush sites with the goal of limiting, to the maximum extent possible, the combat potential of the division march columns and especially its fire support. Combat experience clearly shows that all march columns must have air cover regardless of their ground power.

Editor’s Commentary: Ambush sites are best assaulted from the flank or rear. Conversely, when your force is caught in a killing zone, the best immediate action is to assault into the teeth of the ambush rather than passively remaining and dying in the killing zone. Part of the Afghan division apparently tried defending in the kill zone. The total division casualties are not given, but they were probably significant.

13. Blocking the enemy in an area of villages and then destroying them during the sweep

by Major S. S. Gazaryan³⁰

In February 1985, an intelligence agent brought us information that a guerrilla force of 100–120 men, armed with small arms, was located in the village of Karamagul’.

Our regimental commander decided to destroy this force by sealing off the area and then sweeping it to find and destroy the enemy. My battalion, the 2nd MRB, was given this mission and reinforced with the regiment’s reconnaissance company and two artillery batteries. Six helicopter gunships from army aviation would be in support.

All the forces would be used for the initial blocking action. On the night of 11–12 February, two motorized rifle companies, moving out on foot, by morning had to to occupy the dominant terrain (hills 1864.4 and 1973.0) along the southern and eastern combat sectors. At 0600 hours on 12 February, our 4th MRC and the reconnaissance company had to land and secure the dominant terrain to the north and west of Karamagul’ village by tactical air assaults. The 5th MRC was to establish a platoon-sized ambush to cover any attempted mujahideen withdrawal from Karamagul’ to Batash.

Our plan was to begin the sweep at dawn only after we had seized and occupied the dominant terrain and had surrounded the enemy.

Map 13: Blocking the enemy in an inhabited region and destroying him during the sweep.

Following a 10-minute artillery and helicopter gunship preparation, the reconnaissance company moved forward and began sweeping the area. The enemy tried to break out of the encirclement through the various gullies and ravines. A group of mujahideen attempted to break out to the southwest. Then another group tried to break out of the encirclement. But all the enemy attempts were futile. Only a small part of his force was able to break out through a ravine in the direction of the village of Batash.