But combat experience showed us that good, organized security actions were vital for protecting the day-to-day activities of entire regions, cities and our garrison base camps in Afghanistan. Effectively organized security yielded positive results in the battle with the mujahideen and helped in keeping convoys secure and in sweeping mujahideen from the areas around garrisons, airfields, electric power plants and transfer stations, mountain passes, tunnels and other important sites.1
27. A motorized rifle platoon defends outside Jurm village
by Major S. V. Milyuk2
In August 1980, a large guerrilla force was gathering in the area near Baharak village. Baharak village is located near Faizabad in Badakhshan province. A separate motorized rifle regiment was garrisoned in Faizabad and in the surrounding area. The regiment’s subunits provided stability and control in the province. Due to the large area the regiment had to control, it was split into two bases – one in the fortified village of Baharak (60 kilometers from Faizabad) and the rest in outskirts of Faizabad. The regiment’s tank battalion stayed behind in the Soviet Union.3
The regimental commander decided to destroy the enemy in the hills surrounding Faizabad and then move on the village of Jurm, surround it and then destroy the guerrilla forces which were gathering there. In order to support the timely entry of the regiment into the combat zone, my platoon was sent to fix several sections of road and a bridge over the Kokcha River which had been destroyed. [My entire platoon was not available for the mission, since all my dismounted motorized rifle soldiers were taken for other duties.] I was left with my three BMPs and their crews. I was reinforced with 20 Afghan soldiers on two trucks and a bulldozer. In preparing for this mission, I paid particular attention to the maintenance of my vehicles and their armaments. I loaded 72 hours worth of supplies on these vehicles.
On 3 August, I guided my rag-tag force into the area located two or two-and-one-half kilometers west of Jurm where the destroyed bridge stood. A quick scan of the countryside revealed that the enemy had constructed a well-prepared defense on the probable approaches to the village. I decided to establish a perimeter defense and ordered the force to begin digging-in the vehicles and individual fighting positions. I used the bulldozer to help in this effort. But the bulldozer operators and the local inhabitants who were employed in repairing the road [and bridge] categorically refused to stay with me overnight and returned to Baharak village.
Map 27: A motorized rifle platoon defends outside Jurm village.
We dug our individual and vehicle fighting positions within four hours and I dispersed the Afghan soldiers between the BMPs. Our fighting positions were circular and looked like wells. This design permitted firing throughout 360 degrees and also provided a place for the soldiers to rest. We reinforced the breastworks with stones and clay.
My BMP crews had been in battle before and, therefore, when the enemy began to shell our positions at dusk, they knew how to conduct night fire and were prepared to do so. My drivers started up their tracks at the right time and helped my gunners.4 My vehicle commanders stood outside the tracks and adjusted fire from the strike of the tracer rounds. They talked to the gunners on the intercom by linking the issue 10-meter extension cables to their tanker’s helmets and the intercom sets. They talked by toggling on the helmet’s breast-level switch. The attacking enemy finally withdrew at sunrise, but had not given up his intention to overrun my position. He proved this on the following night when he resumed his shelling.
The time which we were able to gain gave me the opportunity to give detailed orders to my subordinates and arrange coordination. During the daylight, we put out mines and trip flares5 on the approaches to our position and also worked on repairing the road and bridge.
The enemy employed various ruses against our defense. For example, on the next day Private Tagirov noticed that a small group of men, disguised as local natives, was crossing the bridge carrying some kind of material on donkeys. He saw that a thin stream of some kind of liquid was spilling out from one of the packs onto the wooden bridge. We investigated and found that the liquid was gasoline. We washed part of it off with water and covered the area with sand. That night, the enemy fired many tracer rounds at the bridge, but were unable to set it on fire.
Frunze Commentary: The proper organization of the security force and the timely undertaking of necessary measures allowed a motorized rifle platoon to successfully defeat the mujahideen attack.
Editor’s Commentary: Bridge and road repair is a mission that western armies would normally give to an engineer unit. Here, a motorized rifle platoon leader is put in charge of some Afghan troops and civilians and is expected to accomplish this mission. He apparently does so.
Usually, in a defense, the bronegruppa serves a mobile reserve, capable of rushing to a threatened sector. Here, the bronegruppa is the basis of the defense.
In this vignette, the platoon leader does not incorporate high ground into his defense, but leaves a significant piece of high ground immediately outside his perimeter. He may have done so because he could not position his vehicles onto that ground or, when there, his vehicles would not have been able to support each other. Still, it is remarkable that he apparently did not even put a security post or observation post on the dominant terrain.
28. Organizing a security outpost in the suburbs of Kabul
by Major S. V. Mos’kin6
At the end of May 1982, enemy diversionary/reconnaissance groups conducted actions against Soviet Army base camps. In particular, they fired directly on the 40th Army headquarters. The leadership of the guerrilla forces announced that they would destroy the headquarters in the near future. Therefore, the high command decided to upgrade the defense and security of the army headquarters.
As a result, Major Avramenko, my battalion commander, decided to establish a new security post which would be manned by my motorized rifle platoon which had three BTR-70s and 28 men.7 My platoon was reinforced with two AGS-17s and three PK machine guns with night sights. We also received some night vision devices for night observation. An engineer excavator came to the site and within 72 hours, dug the primary and reserve fighting positions for my BTRs and men and then connected all the positions with deep fighting trenches. We dug secret forward redoubts on the flanks of the security outpost for our machine gun crews.
We also built an observation post for a long-range field of vision over our area. We established visual communications between the secret dugouts and the observation post to assist in coordinating fires. We built two barbed wire fences all around the security perimeter. Between the two rows of barbed wire fence, we put in an anti-personnel minefield (using both pressure and tension-release mines). On the far side of the wire, we laid in trip flares. A land-line was installed to give us telephone communications with the battalion commander, a neighboring tank platoon and the duty officer at army headquarters. I organized my post to have two-thirds of my men manning their posts at night and one third during the day. Every soldier had his combat crew assignment and instructions in case of an alert.
Map 28: Layout of a security outpost in the Kabul suburbs.