In September 1982, we intercepted an attempt by an enemy reconnaissance/diversionary group to penetrate to the army headquarters. The mujahideen preceded this provocation by shelling our positions with mortars and launch bombs. On the day before the attempt, they did a reconnaissance of our obstacles by driving a large flock of sheep into our mine field.
And on the next night, the mujahideen attempted to penetrate to the army headquarters using a dry river bed and irrigation canal. We killed two of these who wandered into our mines. We recovered weapons and documents from their bodies.
Frunze Commentary: Following repeated, unsuccessful mujahideen attempts on the army headquarters, future attempts by their reconnaissance/diversionary groups were thwarted by thorough, well-thought out measures to protect the army headquarters including the establishment of a new security outpost on the enemy approach route.
Editor’s Commentary: Due to the preeminence of the offense in Soviet military training, the Soviets rarely trained for the defense. There seems to be a hunker-down-and-wait mentality in their defenses, whereas one would expect to see patrols, moving ambushes, mechanical ambushes, and aggressive reconnaissance. This is particularly true at night. The only night patrols done in this vignette are done by the Afghan police. After a unit has gone to ground so thoroughly, it is hard to imagine putting it into an aggressive action without some serious readjustments and retraining. The unit seems to have bunker mentality.
29. Repelling a raid on a security post
by Major I. A. Egiazarov8
During the second half of June 1982, the high command decided to strengthen and expand Afghan government power around the city of Rukha in the Panjsher valley. They decided to do this during the course of an operation in the Panjsher valley which involved Afghan government forces and a SPETSNAZ detachment. The Afghan Army had a series of security outposts on the dominant heights surrounding Rukha. These posts were poorly fortified, there were not enough soldiers and heavy weapons to hold them, and the Afghan soldiers’ morale was low. The high command decided to reinforce the existing posts and to add additional outposts by assigning men from a SPETSNAZ detachment to man them.9
Thus on the 13th of June, I received orders to take my 31st SPETSNAZ Group and occupy the heights opposite the rest of the force across the Panjsher River.10 I was a lieutenant at the time. My commander wanted me to establish an observation post and look for mujahideen activity in the area of the hamlet of Marishtan. This would also deny the enemy the opportunity to conduct his own reconnaissance and launch a surprise attack on our battalion.
There were 15 men in my 31st SPETSNAZ Reconnaissance Group. Besides small arms, we had two AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, one DShK heavy machine gun and one 82mm “tray” mortar. We were supported by an artillery battery [that belonged to the SPETSNAZ detachment]. We expected enemy action in the region on 15 or 16 July, and that action might include an assault on the security outposts.
Map 29: Repelling a raid on a security outpost.
We occupied our assigned peak on 15 July and began fortifying the position. This was our order of work. First, prepare firing positions and establish an integrated, comprehensive firing plan. Second, fortify the positions with local materials to blend in with the natural terrain and build covered shelters for the troops. Third, build tiered observation posts out of stone and clay. Fourth, mine the approaches to the post. Fifth, on a nearby terrace, build a hidden, tanglefoot obstacle.11 Sixth, organize an uninterrupted schedule of observation and security. Three men were always on guard during the day and seven men were always on guard at night. The detachment resupplied us with ammunition and food every three days.
About 1830 hours on 18 July, we were eating dinner and observation was lax. [Probably my lookouts had also decided to eat without my authorization]. During this time of relaxed vigilance, the enemy snuck onto our high terrace, climbed to within 10 meters of our defensive position and simultaneously opened fire with three DShK heavy machine guns from “Black hill” and “Fang mountain”. My men, with the exception of two look-outs, dove behind the walls and in the dugouts for shelter. The guerrillas had resolutely seized the initiative and pushed their attack forward, throwing grenades as they came. The mujahideen having climbed onto our high terrace, ran toward our defenses, but were caught in our tanglefoot. This broke their attack and we were able to destroy them with fire from our dugouts. The enemy left four corpses on the terrace. The rest withdrew under the cover of DShK fire. We had no casualties.
Editor’s Commentary: Even, and sometimes especially, in elite forces, the commander must stay on top of his personnel and ensure that they maintain vigilance and perform other routine soldiers’ duties. Soldiers’ carelessness almost led to the destruction of this OP.
This vignette indicates that an artillery battery may have been part of a SPETSNAZ detachment. In this particular vignette, the detachment was operating within MRLS range, since part of the artillery plan is for MRLS.
The Soviet tanglefoot obstacle appears to be a most effective obstacle. It has not been adopted by western armies. Perhaps these armies ought to consider doing so.
30. A mobile security patrol in combat near the village of Chandaran
by LTC F. V. Zhitoryuk12
In April 1985, the 1st Motorized Battalion, which I commanded, was detailed to perform guard and security duties within my regiment’s 65-kilometer stretch of the Termez-Kabul highway. I was reinforced with a tank company and an artillery battery. My mission was to secure the unimpeded movement of Soviet and Afghan convoys in my area of responsibility and to prevent the demolition of the pipeline, bridges and sections of highway.
My regimental commander13 constituted 14 mobile security patrols and 23 security posts for the mission. A reinforced motorized rifle platoon usually functions as a mobile security patrol. A motorized rifle company usually constitutes two or three mobile security patrols and five or six security posts. I designated my share of the patrols and posts and constituted a reserve in case I suddenly had to do battle with the mujahideen.
Mobile security patrol #31 was my largest mobile security patrol since I had integrated my CP/OP in that grouping. The patrol had 193 men including my battalion command group, a signal platoon, the 1st firing platoon of my mortar battery, a tank company (minus one platoon), the artillery battery (minus a firing platoon), and the battalion’s recon platoon.
A guerrilla force of about 500 men operated in my battalion’s area of responsibility. They were armed with 82mm mortars, recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns, launch bombs and many small arms.
From 16 to 21 April, our division participated in an operation to destroy guerrilla forces in this region. After the operation, the participating units and subunits returned to their base camps. Guerrilla activity quickly picked up. Agent reconnaissance reported that a wounded miner [i.e. one who emplaces land mines] was located in Chandaran village. This miner had been trained by foreign services. Two renegade Russian soldiers who had gone over to the mujahideen in 1981 and 1983 were guarding the miner.
I decided to seal off the village on the night of 22–23 April and destroy the enemy. I assembled my recon platoon, the 1st platoon of my 3rd MRC, and a force from a battalion of Afghan “Sarandoy” for the mission. The group consisted of 73 men, four tanks, eight BTRs, and two “Vasilek” automatic mortars. We were supported by the artillery battery.