The results of this minor affair were all positive: the British had been driven from the last good position blocking the south-western passage into Cyrenaica, German troops had proved themselves capable of fighting a desert campaign, and 8th Army was not as strong as Italian intelligence officers had believed it to be. Rommel began to consider whether he might not open an offensive, using the forces at his disposal rather than wait until the panzer division arrived from Germany. He knew that to carry out this scheme would flout the authority of his Italian superior, that he would be acting without Hitler's consent or knowledge, and that he would be ignoring the advance of OKH. He made the decision and ordered 5th Light Division to resume the advance upon Agedabia. On 2 April it drove up the Via Balbia, in a compact group with the reconnaissance battalion in the van followed by the machine gun battalion. The panzers were out guarding the flanks and from horizon to horizon the sky was filled with pillars of dust as the vehicles ploughed their way forward. British artillery fire forced the reconnaissance unit to deploy and to take up battle formation but no sooner had the unit shaken itself out for battle than the rearguard withdrew - a wearying tactic whicr^the British used throughout the morning. Tanks from 8th Army were reported to be in position south east of Agedabia and Streich commanding 5th Light ordered the panzer regiment, the anti-tank detachment, and the machine gun battalion to move east of the road. The machine gunners began to move into position but were halted south of the town. Rommel, up with the forward troops in his usual fashion, swung the reconnaissance battalion round the left flank; a move which brought it floundering in a salt marsh. The panzer regiment then struck at the British forces, feinting and withdrawing, and enticing the British armour on to the screen of 8.8 cm guns which stood waiting. The 5th Royal Tank Regiment, true to cavalry tradition, charged the enemy and were brought under fire by the 8.8s at almost point blank range. Twenty-five of the British vehicles lay broken or burning in front of the gun line and then the 2nd Battalion of 5th Panzer Regiment swung back and drove the RTR, off the field and pursued them northwards. Meanwhile the Tower Hamlets Rifles, a London territorial unit, had come under attack and had lost a company. Only another tank charge brought the hard pressed British infantry relief from the German panzers.

This pressure against the British southern flank reacted upon the stubborn defence which was being put up against the machine gun battalion on the central sector. Thus, by midday the machine gunners had advanced across an area dotted with the palls of black and acrid smoke rising from tanks which 5th Panzer Regiment had 'brewed up' and vast clouds hanging in the sky above depots which 8th Army had destroyed before their withdrawal.

The reconnaissance battalion having dragged itself from the salt marsh pushed on to the town and joined forces with the machine gun battalion. Their combined strength brought the advance across the Tripoli-Cyrenaica frontier and onward to Zuetina. Nightfall brought a halt to the fighting and the divisional units, having laagered, made preparations to maintain the advance during the following day and to pursue closely the enemy who was with­drawing upon Benghasi. Rommel's firm order was to keep contact with the British forces. They must not be allowed to shake off the German advanced units. During the night the Italian divisions and the Santa Maria detachment closed up on the German spearhead. .

The battle was proceeding to that date in the manner in which Rommel had planned that it should go. The Agedabia wells had been taken, the way into Cyrenaica was open, and air reconnaissance as well as ground observation indicated that the British were abandoning the province in some disorder and were withdrawing upon Benghasi leaving behind them huge masses of stores. The immediate threat to Tripoli had been averted and the objective which OKH had hoped might be accomplished during May was in German hands by April.

It was on the battlefield at Agedabia that Rommel decided upon his next and very controversial move. He realised that it was useless to drive the British before the German armour; the 8th Army must be smashed in open battle. It will be seen from the map which appears on page 80 that, starting at El Agheila, Cyrenaica projects as a huge bulge, the Bight of Bomba, into the Mediterranean and that the Via Balbia follows this coastline. Rommel reasoned that the British retreat would be by road and, if this were so, then a swift advance along native tracks and via Msus and Mechili to Derna, that is across the chord of the bulge, would bring his forces to the eastern border of Cyrenaica behind the British and thus cut them off from their bases. He expressed this intention to his allies and to his staff; most of them were horrified for he was suggesting that a major military grouping of limited desert experience should cross a 400-mile expanse of waterless desert. The Italians said that such an operation was out of the question. [4]

It required months of preparation; the danger that columns might become separated and lost in the almost trackless expanse was too great and, in any case, the sand seas and the mountainous djebel were both impassable. Rommel who had personally reconnoitred the routes from the air declared them to be passable. In any case the British had traversed the desert and what they could do the Axis troops could also accomplish. His own quartermaster's department pointed out that there would be problems with both water and fuel and that tyres would be cut to shreds in the rough, cross-country going. Rommel proposed the most draconian measures to overcome the fuel and water crises. The forward movement of all German and Italian fighting units was halted. Every avail­able truck which could be taken, commandeered, or requisitioned was assembled and soon there was a lorried force of more than 800 vehicles.

Each lorry was to ferry fuel and water to the front line troops and when sufficient had been brought forward the trucks would be prepared for the trans-desert trip. With the fighting column's lorries would be 6 days fuel, 5 days water ration, 5 days food including two days hard tack, and only sufficient ammunition for one day's battle, for it was not considered that there would be any fighting during the approach march to Derna. In the supply columns whatever was the lorry's normal load would be halved and the balance made up of petrol. Rommel's intention was that his whole force would be a self-contained combat group. Within two days the whole scheme had been worked out and the fuel supplies had been brought forward. The great desert trek could begin. The battle plan was straightforward. There were to be several columns. Those of the left flank - a German reconnaissance battalion and Brescia Division — who were to hold the British and slow down the pace of their withdrawal, were to advance along the Via Balbia and go on to capture Benghasi. This column would then divide and the main body would thrust towards the strategically important cross-roads at Mechili, while the second and weaker column from Brescia Division would continue up the road exerting pressure upon the British before going on to capture Derna.

All the trans-desert columns were to head, by various tracks, towards Mechili. One of the major columns would be divided to form a pincer move­ment aimed at the objective. One main group would form the outer left wing and 2nd Machine Gun Battalion, forming the inner wing of these two columns, was to advance to Solluch at which point a column of empty oil drums pointed due east marking the desert track to the objective and along which the machine gunners were to advance. The main, southern pincer led by the commander of 5th Light Division, was to move towards Mechili along the Trigh el Abd. This column was headed by 8th Machine Gun Battalion and followed by an anti-tank company, a panzer company, the Italian Santa Maria detachment, a motor cycle company, and a motorised artillery battalion from Ariete Division. Rommel's intention was two-fold: he was trying to create the impression that the Axis forces were stronger than in fact they were and, that the German objective was a tactical one — Benghasi — and not a strategic one, the destruction of 8th Army's field force. [5]