In August 1939, as if to und'erline the demand by the military for time to prepare the army, Mussolini declared that Italy would take no part in the war which had just broken out but that she would still remain in the Axis. This quasi-neutral position was abandoned during the campaign in France when Mussolini, fearful that Italy's influence in Hitler's new, restructured Europe would be too small, declared war. This declaration, made on 10 June 1940, a direct rejection of the advice given to the Duce by Badoglio, the Chief of the General Staff, that Italy could not sustain a long war against the western Allies, spread hostilities into Africa. As a result of the defeat of France, the French colonial territory of Tunisia had become a neutral power, Libya was no longer a buffer between the African territories of France and
Great Britain and Mussolini could now turn the colonial might of the Italian empire in North Africa against the British in Egypt. The Germans, too, having defeated France could now concentrate upon the single enemy Britain and, during July, von Brauschtisch, C-in-C of the German Army drew up a plan with five alternatives for future operations in the Mediterranean. Included among these alternatives was the seizure of Gibraltar and the despatch of a panzer unit to support the Italians in their war in North Africa. If both these operations were successfully executed then British influence in the Mediterranean would be destroyed and it was, perhaps, considered that Malta would then fall of its own accord for, surprisingly, no plan was put forward for an attack upon that island.
A far-seeing staff officer at Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), Army High Command, had prepared a monograph on the development of the campaign in Africa in which it was proposed that a panzer Corps be sent to aid the Italians, and the OKH planning section was able to report that sufficient vehicles and military stores could be made available to form a Corps. Hitler had also been thinking along parallel lines and having studied the staff paper then asked certain questions, the most important of which was how soon such a Corps could be ready for action. OKH replied that the movement of troops, their transportation, acclimatisation, and the shipping of the necessary equipment would not permit the force to be used in combat operations before December 1940. Discussions at OKH then revolved around the intention to send a two-division expeditionary force to Africa.
Meanwhile in Libya the declaration of war by Mussolini had caught the Army off-balance. So sudden had been the Italian dictator's volte-face that the military was completely unprepared for the demands which were then made upon it and which were to be made at later dates - irrespective of whether these were defensive in character, that is to say, to halt a British attack or whether they were offensive, that is, to invade Egypt. Mussolini ordered an advance into Egypt overriding the advice of Marshal Graziani, the Commander-in-Chief in Libya, that an offensive should not be undertaken until the spring of 1941, by which time there would be an Italian Army capable of meeting the Duce's imperious demands for glory and victory.
The Italians thrust into Egypt on 13 September 1940 and had reached Sidi Barani on the following day. Here Graziani halted to prepare the next step of the advance which he anticipated would bring him to Mersa Matruh by December. In Germany Hitler had reconsidered the African venture proposing that it might be more advantageous to the Italians if units of brigade strength were sent and his proposals were passed to the Italian Military Attache in Berlin. [1]
When Hitler and Mussolini met in the Brenner Pass during October 1940, these intentions were discussed more fully and it was decided to send a small but powerful, armoured brigade to North Africa and that the men for this unit would be drawn from 3rd Panzer Division. It was also proposed that this unit together with VHIth Air Corps would be placed under Graziani's command. On 24 October Hitler received a pessimistic report from General von Thoma whom he had sent on a fact-finding mission to Libya. The burden of von Thoma's memorandum was a statement which a succession of German military commanders were to repeat without avail to the end of the war in Africa, namely that a successful conclusion to operations in that theatre depended upon the ability to supply the forces in the field. He went on to stress that, as a result of British control of the seas and the poor harbour facilities in Libya, it would not be possible to supply a force larger in size than four divisions but that this was the minimum strength required to bring victory.
Hitler rejected Thoma's appreciation and his counter proposal of a single division to be sent to Africa was in turn dismissed by Thoma who said :hat a single German division could not affect the situation. Hitler stated his belief in the ability of the Italians to maintain their position against the British and repeated that the whole purpose of sending a German contingent was to hold Italy loyal to the Axis, a statement of intent which was to be echoed by senior German officers in the Mediterranean theatre for the next two years. In November Hitler ordered that the embarkation of 3rd Panzer Division was to be halted and that no movement of German troops was to take place ontil the Italians had captured Mersa Matruh in Egypt. A formal declaration of intent was expressed in Instruction No 18, issued by OKW, on 12 November 1940, which stated under the heading The Italian offensive against Egypt' that,
'German forces will be used, if at all, only when the Italians have reached Mersa Matruh and in the first instance these will be Air Force units for whom the Italians will have provided aerodromes. The Armed Forces are to prepare for the employment of their units in this or any other North African theatre of operations:
Army: The Army will hold ready for use in North Africa a panzer division.
Navy: The Navy is to convert ships lying in Italian ports into troop transports with which to convoy strong bodies of troops with best possible speed to Libya, or to some other place in North Africa.
Air Force: The Air Force is to prepare to carry out air operations against Alexandria or the Suez canal and to block the latter so as to deny its use to the British.'
During December while the euphoria of victory was yet with the Italians further discussions took place between the Axis Supreme Commands at Innsbruck, during which Graziani expressed Mussolini's intention of fighting the war in Africa without German help. In view of this declaration 3rd Panzer Division was stood down and plans for German intervention in Africa were no longer proceeded with.
The British forces, which were fighting against the Italians, were few in number and were spread over a 200-mile area from Sollum, on the coast, to the Siwa Oasis. The weakness of this force did not deter its commander General Wavell from undertaking an offensive and the mass of his Army of the Nile struck out of the desert and into the Italian flank on 9 December. Collaborating closely with the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, WavelFs 30,000 men defeated an Italian Army ten times its number. By 11 December, Sidi Barani had been recaptured, on 5 January 1941 Bardia fell, Tobruk followed on 23 January, and by February British and Imperial troops had occupied Marmarica, most of Cyrenaica, and much of Tripolitania. But then with his forces exhausted and his supply lines over-extended, Wavell halted the advance along the edge of the great Sirte Desert. Before him lay the remnants of the broken Italian Army whose remaining unshattered units were preparing to dig in around the capital city of Tripoli ready to fight the final battle. With the loss of Tripolitania the whole of Libya would pass under the control of the British who would then be able to turn upon and conquer the Italian Somaliland and Ethiopian territories piecemeal. It was, therefore, vital to the Axis war effort that a foothold be retained along the North African coast and this bridgehead expanded to form a firm base for future operations aimed at the recapture of the lost provinces and to prevent the British establishing a base from which to attack Sicily and the Italian mainland.