It was against this background of urgency and Italian despair — the defeat of Graziani's 10th Army coupled with the reverses which other Italian armies were suffering in the war with Greece — that Mussolini was forced to ask for that German assistance which he had declined. Hitler responding to his Axis partner's needs reactivated the plan to send a German force to Africa. The first results of this support was an air raid upon Malta on 10 January by machines from Xth Air Corps but help was needed more urgently on the ground and a memorandum to this effect, handed to the German liaison officer with Commando Supremo (Italian Supreme Headquarters) was forwarded to Hitler. His reaction was immediate and on 9 January he decided to send a blocking force to Tripolitania, outlining his intentions in Instruction No 22, dated 11 January. In the section which dealt with events in Africa he wrote:
'The situation in the Mediterranean demands that for strategic, political and psychological reasons Germany must give assistance ... (to Italy) ... and I order that a blocking force be raised by OKH which must be capable of supporting our allies against British armour in their defence of Tripolitania. Preparations must be concluded so that this unit can be shipped to Tripoli in conjunction with an Italian armoured and motorised division.'
The critical situation in which the Italians now found themselves as a result of the loss of Tobruk, one of their main bases, produced the urgent demand from General von Rintelen serving at Commando Supremo that a German unit strong enough to operate offensively and not merely as a blocking force be despatched without delay. His appreciation of the situation was shared by General Funck who had returned from a visit of inspection to Libya and who reported that Graziani's intention was to convert Tripoli into a fortified town. Funck proposed that a panzer Corps be sent to carry out an offensive to regain Cyrenaica. Hitler then entered one of those periods of indecision which bedevilled his relations with his commanders and his allies and could not make up his mind on either the necessity for, or the nature of, the German formation to be used in Africa. To the request to increase greatly the strength of the blocking force, OKH replied that such an increase would have to be taken from the forces being assembled for the campaign in Greece and that this in turn would weaken the forces to be used against Russia.
The OKW, proposed in turn that the blocking force be reinforced, in the first instance, only by a panzer regiment and that at later dates other components of a panzer division could be sent across to Africa. It was also proposed that the German and Italian mobile, that is motorised and panzer, units be under the command of a German Corps commander. Hitler weighed the disadvantages that would accrue from the loss of the Italian colonies against the advantage of successfully intervening in Africa, reached his decision, and issued instructions to begin embarking troops. But 3rd Panzer Divisions had been stood down and a new formation needed to be raised. Into this new division entitled 5th Light was incorporated 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 39th Anti-tank Battalion, a light artillery battalion, a panzer company, and a medical company. The special tropical service fuel and ammunition, water filtering equipment and water cans which had been assembled for 3rd Panzer was also taken over by 5th Light.
There were daily meetings and arguments with the quartermaster's department of the Army which was involved with preparations for the attack upon Russia and who, lacking other criteria, based their calculations for the requirements of the new force upon European campaigns with adequate water supplies and good roads. The division scale of transport was finally laid down at only two-thirds of the requirements which the divisional officers had demanded. Preparations were then made to ship the first units across to Tripoli, and these were to be followed by 5th Panzer Regiment which in turn was to be reinforced by a second panzer division.
On 6 February Hitler then gave instructions that the blocking line was to be as far east as possible - in the Sirte Desert - and also ordered that the role of 5th Light Division was, initially, to be one of aggressive defence. On the same day OKW issued its own orders to commence Operation Sonnenblume - the transport of German forces to Tripoli. The Africa Corps was on its way.
On the question of who was to command the Africa Corps Hitler selected Genera! Rommel, who had been commander of his Escort Regiment during the campaign in Poland and on 7 February he briefed the new Corps commander on his tasks, the most important of which was to hold Tripolitania at all costs.
The German troops who disembarked in Tripoli on 11 February were followed by the first fighting units three days later. These men were the advanced guard of a force which was to be known by many titles, the one which it retained longest being that of Panzer Army Africa, but which is more famous for the name which it held only a relatively short time — Africa Corps.
The tasks, responsibilities, and duties of this formation had been worked out by Hitler and Commando Supremo and included within the terms of reference were the following:
(1) For tactical purposes the general officer commanding German troops is subordinate to the Italian Supreme Command in Libya. He is responsible to OKH for all other decisions,
(2) German troops may only be used as complete units ...
(3) German troops may not be distributed in small groups along the front.
(4) In the event of the German commander being given an order which, in his opinion, could lead to his force being lost then he had the right and duty to ask for Hitler's decision, although he must inform the Italian High Command that he is making this appeal.
(5) The Xth Air Corps remains under the command of supreme commander Luftwaffe and is to collaborate with the Italian Air Force.
On 9 February 1941, a conference between Mussolini and von Rintelen led to Mussolini accepting Rommel as commander of the joint German/Italian mobile forces and on the same day came the announcement that Mussolini had replaced Graziani by Gariboldi, the former commander of the Italian 5th Army. The Axis leader confirmed Hitler's intention that Tripolitania was to be defended by aggressive defence in the Sirte. Rommel then flew to Rome on 11 February for a conference with Mussolini and, in the afternoon of the same day, went on to Sicily for a briefing on the situation in Libya by Xth Air Corps commander. By the following day Rommel was in Africa learning at first hand of the serious situation in which the Italian Army was placed.
He flew back to Germany and laid before Hitler his plans on the course of the operations which he intended to conduct in a counter-offensive to reconquer Cyrenaica. He proposed to wait and to hold the blocking line until his two German divisions, 5th Light and 15th Panzer, had arrived and then together with the Italian armoured division Ariete and the motorised division Trento he would attack the British. Rommel was not aware and neither were his superiors at OKW nor Commando Supremo that Wavell had been ordered to give active military support to the Greeks and that, even as Rommel descended upon Africa once again, an expeditionary force drawn from the British desert army was preparing to leave for Greece, leaving only a thin screen to garrison the conquered territories and to watch the badly shaken Italian armies.
The Desert
The previous chapter has stated how 3rd Panzer Division was to be a nucleus in the Africa Corps organisation and that how, within six months, an expeditionary force had been selected, had been stood down, a new unit reformed, despatched, and was ready for action. In view of the urgency there had been little time for preparation and the German Army in undertaking a campaign in tropical desert regions was entering very much into terra incognita. With the exception of reports based upon the experiences of von Lettow-Vorbeck's force, which had fought in equatorial Africa during the First World War, and upon the recollections of veterans who had fought with the Turks in Palestine, there were no first hand experiences upon which the staff could make their plans.