The attitude of the French in Tunisia was dichotomatic. The senior officers of the services were either wholly or partially loyal to the Vichy French Government of Marshal Petain which had concluded an armistice with the Axis in 1940. Many of these officers and their civilian counterparts were prepared to tolerate and, in some cases, support actively an Axis occupation of the French North African territories. Other officers, particularly in the lower echelons of the military hierarchy, were pro-Allied and hoped to prevent an Axis occupation by delaying the Germans and the Italians and by allowing unhindered passage to the Allied armies.

Certainly the troops of Koch's paratroop spearhead had found the delay­ing tactics of the French quite exasperating. It was important for the German commander to know the French intention; whether General Barre was intending to remain neutral and passive or whether he was determined to go over to the Allies and deny to the Germans access to the bridgeheads across the Medjerda river. The area which his division was holding was of strategic importance and delay in clarifying the situation was of benefit to the Allies and a disadvantage to the Germans. French senior military officers deferred conversations between the paratroop officer delegation and the commanding general until leading elements of British troops, men of 6th Battalion the Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, had entered and occupied Beja. The British 78th Infantry Division at that time comprised almost the whole of the Allied fighting strength in northern Tunisia and one of its Brigades, the 36th, was advancing as a left-hand column upon Bizerta, spreading a thin film of troops across the countryside.

The head of the column, the striking point, was aiming at Djebel Abiod and the important road junctions, in that place, of the Bone—Beja, and Bone— Bizerta highways. A second brigade of 78th Division, the llth Infantry Brigade, was advancing along the Beja road towards Medjez el Bab with the ultimate intention of thrusting towards Tunis. Supporting the two British infantry brigades was an Anglo-American motorised and armoured unit called Blade Force. The Allied fist with two ringers thrusting towards the enemy's vitals was preparing to strike.

The first major clash between the British and the Germans in Tunisia happened during the early afternoon of 17 November, when Major Witzig's battle group advanced upon Abiod from Mateur, aiming to reach Tabarka. His column was made up of two paratroop companies from the Para-Engineer Regiment's 11th Battalion, a squadron of 15 Panzer IVs, two Italian SP guns, a troop of 2cm flak guns, and a battery of 10.5cm cannon.

At Abiod three rifle companies of the West Kents, supported by a troop of 25-pounder guns and elements from 5th Battalion The Northamptonshire Regiment, were in position and dug in around the houses on the eastern side of the small town. The British infantry held fire even as the vehicles of the German battle group rolled past the houses and not until the 25-pounders opened up at almost point-blank range did the battle open. With the first shots some of Witzig's tanks were destroyed and the column was brought to a halt. The lorry-borne paratroops debussed and formed a firing line in front of the town while others raced for high ground and the artillery began a bom­bardment of the British positions. Under this barrage the soft-skinned vehicles were withdrawn. Witzig flung out a small infantry group to probe the British defences while the 2cm flak gun, which had halted and taken up position on the road, opened fire and poured a barrage into and upon the West Kent positions until a direct hit from a 25-pounder shell smashed the weapon and killed the crew.

Towards evening the firing died away and both sides took stock of the situation. Witzig had lost eight of his tanks and had failed to take the road junction but his infantry was on the important high ground and he was, therefore, in a superior tactical position. He could feel content; his small force may not have reached its given objectives but it had halted the eastward advance of a British column. A reshuffle of German forces during that evening brought the Witzig Group under the command of the newly formed von Broich Division. To build up the striking power of this division all Witzig's heavy weapons were withdrawn from him and handed over to Broich.

For the next two days barrage and counter-barrage succeeded each other in the Abiod sector while both sides sent out patrols to probe for weaknesses in the enemy's front. One German fighting patrol made up of No 1 Company of the Para Engineer Battalion set out on the night of 21/22 November just after midnight and had, by 03.00hrs, reached the road outside and to the north of Abiod. A challenge rang out from the British sentries, the para-engineers rushed the houses firing their machine pistols and hefting explosive charges into the buildings destroying British opposition. They returned to their own lines with minimal casualties.

The Luftwaffe was much in evidence during this period bombing and strafing the forward British positions and thereby aiding the efforts of the German ground forces. During the latter half of November Witzig's battle group, shrunken in number by casualties, received an Italian paratroop battalion as reinforcement. This crack unit was immediately committed to battle and launched an attack upon the 36th Brigade positions around Abiod. The assault collapsed in the fire of the British infantry and was beaten into the ground. Shattered by its losses the Italian unit was withdrawn and Witzig's men took over their former positions.

Vehicles of the only German armoured car reconnaissance unit in Tunisia were caught and destroyed in an ambush set by a British paratroop company in the area of Sidi Nsir during 18 November. Both sides were testing each other. This process continued on 20 November, when part of British 11th Brigade thrust a column along the valley of the Djournina towards Mateur with the intention of outflanking Witzig's group. The German commander relying upon the support of some Italian SP artillery switched the guns from flank to flank - at Abiod halting an infantry drive at Sidi Nsir stopping the advance of part of a British paratroop battalion. During this period a British armoured force was assembled to drive back the Axis forces from their positions on the Djebel Abiod and under this armoured pressure Witzig's met made a methodical, step-by-step withdrawal until they reached prepared defensive positions at Jefna.

Allied pressure during 18 November served to convince the Germans thai the time of crisis was at hand and that an all-out Allied offensive could be wholly expected. This anticipated advance, as the Germans saw it, would be facilitated by the attitude of the French vis-a-vis the Allies, for the Anglo-Saxons would be allowed to move with best speed towards the German bridgeheads. Nehring at that time had only four 8.8cm guns in Tunisia and he personally selected the sites on which they were placed. One was on the Pom du Fahs road and two others were set up to act as the last artillery defence for the capital. But, as the hours passed without the decisive thrust being made, Nehring grew more confident and flung out more and more battle groups to seize and to hold key points and vital heights. There could be no question of forming a battle line, just pockets of battle hardened men utilising even minute and every feature and turning both to thek advantage. As new units were formed or arrived in the akports they were rushed to the front and injected piecemeal into any sector where the need was greatest.

Kesselring, meanwhile, had promised that with 10th Panzer, the Hermanc Goering and the 334th Infantry Divisions, together with two infantry divisions which the Italians had promised to supply, a new Army would be created. [21]