Thus, on 19 November and from the German command point of view, the situation was that the northern area around Djebel Abiod was secure. In the centre, around Medjez el Bab, the position was still uncertain. In the south the western Allies had, as yet, made no appearance. The time had come for Nehring to seize quickly and to hold open the southern gateway, the Gabes area, and thus permit the safe withdrawal of Rommel's forces. But from where were the men to come to carry out this operation? An immediate solution presented itself in a small group of para-engineers who had been serving with Rommel in the desert and who were now in the Gabes region. Many of this handful of men were sick or convalescent and all were due to go on leave to Germany. But at the call of duty they took up battle positions, occupying key points in the region and determined to hold them until reinforcements reached them from the bridgehead area.
Back in the northern sector a company of 5th Para was assembled and together with No 3 Company of Kesselring's headquarters defence battalion was embarked into 12 JU 52s with the intention of landing upon and holding the aerodromes at Gabes as well, the Gabes Gap itself. The arrival of the German machines on the runway at Gabes was the signal for the French troops holding the area to open fire with machine guns and artillery. The Junkers aeroplanes and their paratroop load were driven off and headed northwards again back to the aerodrome from which they had taken off. En route to Tunis a hurried conference between the leaders of the enterprise produced a new plan and it was decided to make an emergency landing on a suitable piece of flat land some 30 miles from Gabes. The machines landed, the paratroops disembarked, and sent out a reconnaissance patrol to Gabes. A second patrol went out to capture the airport to prepare for the landing of follow-up troops. The remainder of the small command then took up all round defensive positions. A third patrol went out — seven men under command of a lance corporal — and these, having been taken prisoner by the French, were brought back to Gabes aerodrome for interrogation. By bluff they convinced the French commander that unless he surrendered the place by the following morning it would be laid flat by a Stuka attack.On the morning of 18th the sound of aircraft was heard and a stream of JU 52s was seen roaring towards the aerodrome with the intention of air landing the troops who were to occupy the Gabes Gap. The French, convinced that they were to be bombed from the air, abandoned the airfield and the us landed.
One of the vital positions for the passage of the desert army had been taken almost without bloodshed. As early as 19 November small detachments of German and Italian troops in southern Tunisia had been active on reconnaissance patrols. Based on Zarhouan and Pont du Fahs they had ranged across the Goubellat plain, had reached Tebourba, El Bathan, and the whole area to the south-west of Tunis without meeting any serious opposition. Axis troops occupied Ksar Tyr on 20 November and El Aroussa three days later. The towns of Sousse and Sfax were taken over and a force of Germans and Italians hastily assembled and moved westwards to hold the hills around Kairouan against an expected- Allied thrust in that area. On other sectors demolition teams went out to mine roads and to destroy bridges in areas which the Germans were too weak in number to hold. The whole region was sealed by the second day and the paratroops prepared defensive positions from which they first held, and then threw back, the initial thrusts made against them by American forces striking towards Gabes.
Back on the line of the Medjerda river, at Medjez el Bab, the spearheads of British 36th Brigade were posing a threat to 3rd Battalion of Koch's regiment. Worried at the approach of the British and angered by the prevarication of the French, the German commander ordered an advance to the river to secure the vital crossings. As the German advanced guard moved towards the first houses on the eastern bank of the river they were met with fire from French troops in a bridgehead which they still held on the eastern side. To destroy this bridgehead and to attack the Allied armoured and motorised units which had now been identified and which had mixed with the French vehicles, a Stuka assault was ordered for 19 November. Under cover of this an attempt would be made to seize Medjez el Bab by coup de main and should this fail then the paratroops were to occupy and to hold the high ground, thereby preventing the British and the Americans from advancing eastwards towards Tunis.
Meanwhile another company of paratroops had taken over the aerodrome at Djedeida and had begun to prepare it for use as a forward air base by the Luftwaffe's fighters. With the small forces at their disposal the German commanders were achieving a great deal.
At 04.00hrs on the morning of 19th, along the line of the Medjerda river. German infantry and paratroops were in position, hidden in olive groves, ready to attack and to seize the crossroads behind the west bank. To secure the southern flank of the attack an anti-tank gun was positioned on the road going down to Goubellat, with orders to halt any Allied move northward. Contingency plans in the event of a pre-emptive move by the French were drawn up and any advance by them would lead to the bridge being blocked while a secondary move would thrust into the flank of their assault.
The dawn bombardment to open the attack did not materialise and not until 11.30hrs in the light of a bright, fine day did four ME 109s appear escorting a Stuka squadron; these machines swept down upon the French positions with sirens screaming. Under the noise of the bombardment, the crash of bombs, and the howling sirens, the ground assault began with fire from every available weapon. The sudden vicious attack broke the French and many rushed for shelter in the nearby houses. Those who remained were smashed aside by the German infantry, who fought their way into the houses on the eastern bank while the paratroops stormed towards the bridge. But there the advance halted for none could cross the structure in the face of the curtain of fire which the French artillery had laid around it. The German thrust was then moved to a flank and a storm troop detachment was sent across the river at a point to the left of the bridge and ordered to carry the attack forward by indirect assault. The small detachment waded through the icy waters firing their rifles and machine pistols as fast as they could reload them. They attained the western bank, took out a French defensive position, worked their way towards the bridge from which they drove the French defenders, and established a bridgehead. But losses had reduced, and were continuing to diminish, the group. When, finally, the numbers were down tc four men the survivors withdrew to their own units on the eastern bank.
Allies atack to Tunis
During the evening of 19 November Koch formed 10 assault groups, armec them with explosives, and set them tasks of destroying given targets inside Medjez el Bab: either a French defensive position, an artillery post, a depot, or some other installation. The first group melted into the November darkness at
midnight and others followed at intervals. By 01:00hrs the first explosions were destroying the targets and as the detonations continued and fires began to rage in the town a panic arose among the French and their troops fired wildly about them. Some of the assault detachments were engaged in street fighting when just before dawn the sound of tank tracks announced the arrival of Allied armour. A group of paratroops rushed the tanks, fixed hollow-charge grenades to their exteriors and blew them up. The remainder of the column withdrew towards Oued Zarga. Medjez el Bab, the gateway to Tunis and the lynch pin of the defence, was in German hands.